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Abstract
Open banking facilitates data sharing consented by customers who generate the data, with
a regulatory goal of promoting competition between traditional banks and challenger fintech
entrants. We study lending market competition when sharing banks’ customer data enables
better borrower screening or targeting by fintech lenders. Open banking could make the entire
financial industry better off yet leave all borrowers worse off, even if borrowers could choose
whether to share their data. We highlight the importance of equilibrium credit quality inference
from borrowers’ endogenous sign-up decisions. When data sharing triggers privacy concerns by
facilitating exploitative targeted loans, the equilibrium sign-up population can grow with the
degree of privacy concerns.
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1 Introduction
The world is racing toward an era of open-data economy, thanks to the rapidly evolving information
and digital technology. Customer data—instead of being zealously kept within individual organi-
zations or institutions in an isolated fashion—have become more “open” to external third parties,
whenever customers who generate these data consent to share them. Open banking, an initiative
led by several governments, including Australia and the United Kingdom, leads such a shift toward
the open-data economy. As the global discussion unfolds, many practitioners and policy makers
expect “open banking” to represent perhaps the most transformative trend in the banking industry
in the coming decade.
Although open banking can be viewed as part of broad endeavor by the European Union on
consumer privacy protection (typified by the General Data Protection Regulation), the core princi-
ple of open banking does not stop at customer ownership of their own data, but more importantly,
envision enabling customers to voluntarily share their financial data with other entities, via, say,
application programming interfaces, or APIs (Second Payment Services Directive, PSD2).1 When
Deloitte Insight conducted a survey on open banking in April 2019, it employed the following
“descriptive” definition of open banking, which vividly captures its essence:2
Imagine you want to use a financial product offered by an organization other than your
bank. This product could be anything you feel would help you, such as an app that gives
you a full picture of your financial status, including expenses, savings, and investments
or it could be a mortgage or line of credit. But for this product to be fully useful to you,
it needs information from your bank, such as the amount of money you have coming
in and going out of your accounts, how many accounts you have, how you spend your
money, how much interest you have earned or paid, etc. You then instruct your bank
to share this information with this other institution or app. Should you wish to stop
using this product, you can instruct your bank to stop sharing your data at any given
point in time, with no strings attached. This concept is called open banking.
The idea to let borrowers decide if they want to share data with some third parties—especially com-
peting fintech lenders may have profound implications on credit market competition and welfare.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study this question theoretically. Although
the role of information technology has been studied in the literature of credit market competition as
1The PSD2 in European Union mandates European banks create best practices in APIs, vendor integration,
and data management. Loosely speaking, application programming interfaces, allow users to synchronize, link, and
connect databases; in the context of a banking system, they link a bank’s database (its customers’ information) with
different applications or programs, thus forming a network encouraging the promotion of services, payments, and
products appropriate to each person.
2See endnote 1 on page 17 in Srinivas, Schoeps, and Jain (2019). The article is available at https://bit.ly/
3mIdm2N. Open banking regulations that require banks to share their data with third parties upon customers’ consent
have been implemented in Europe, Australia, and many Asian countries such as Singapore and Japan. Though no
such regulation exists in the U.S. today, major banks are already implementing open data sharing through APIs which
allow third parties to access to their data. Notable examples include JP Morgan Chase (https://bit.ly/3kMjB4V)
and U.S. Bank (https://bit.ly/3oC4KfI).
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we will discuss later, our paper emphasizes that, under open banking, it is borrowers—rather than
lenders—who control lenders’ access to borrower information via their own data sharing decisions.
This conceptual difference is the cornerstone of our analysis, and begets many interesting questions
regarding the welfare implications of open banking.
We consider a traditional bank and a fintech lender in competition with each other. They
conduct independent but imperfect creditworthiness tests before making loan offers to borrowers.
Each borrower can have a high or low credit quality, and the test yields a binary signal of their credit
quality. This framework is based on Broecker (1990) and has been widely used to study lending
market competition as we will discuss later. Similar to common-value auctions, an important
feature of this market is a winner’s curse (i.e., winning a borrower implies the possibility that the
rival lender has observed an unfavorable signal of the borrower’s credit quality). This winner’s
curse essentially determines the lending cost. In equilibrium, the lender that has a better screening
ability and so faces a less severe winner’s curse earns a positive profit in expectation, while the
other one with a weaker screening ability earns a zero profit and sometimes declines to extend an
offer to a borrower even upon seeing a favorable signal.
This baseline credit market competition model is presented in Section 2. We use it to study
the impact of open banking on market performance. Traditional banks enjoy a great advantage
from a vast amount of customer data they possess (say, from transaction accounts, direct deposit
activities, etc). Fintech lenders are often equipped with limited data (usually restricted to social
activities and profiles), but much more advanced data analysis algorithms; without enough data,
however, a better algorithm does not yield more useful information. Therefore, in our benchmark
case with no open banking, we assume that the bank has a better screening ability than the fintech
lender. (We define screening ability as the joint outcome of data availability and data analysis
techniques.) Open banking, by allowing borrowers to share their bank data, can greatly enhance
the competitiveness of the fintech lender as a “challenger.”
We study two types of data that borrowers can share via open banking. The first contains
information on borrowers’ credit quality, which affects the lending cost of financial institutions.
The other type of data potentially reveals borrowers’ preferences for the fintech loan, and these
“privacy” data might enable the fintech to offer targeted loans to exploit borrowers.
Section 3 examines credit-quality data sharing. Once the fintech has an access to the bank’s
data, we assume that its screening ability is improved. Because the fintech has a more advanced
data analysis algorithm, it could even surpass the bank in screening borrowers, especially when it
also has some independent data sources.3 The improvement of the fintech’s screening ability has
two effects: First, as the fintech now can better identify a borrower’s true type, it helps high credit
quality borrowers but hurts low credit quality borrowers. This is a standard “information effect.”
Second, it also affects the extent of winner’s curse that each lender faces, and so the degree of lending
competition. This “strategic effect” can go either direction: lending competition will be intensified
3For example, Berg, Burg, Gombović, and Puri (2020) provide evidence that fintech lenders use a different source
of information, digital footprints, to assess customers’ creditworthiness; digital footprints improve the predictive
power of traditional credit bureau data when combined with the latter.
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(softened) if the screening ability gap between the two lenders shrinks (expands). In particular, if
open banking expands the screening ability gap sufficiently (i.e., if open banking “overempowers”
the fintech), it will hurt both types of borrowers but improve industry profit. Reflecting on the
celebrated selling point that open banking promotes competition and benefits borrowers, we hence
highlight that data sharing may backfire and increase the competitiveness of the challenger lender
too much.
The key question is then: can the very nature of open banking—borrowers deciding whether
to opt in to share their banking data with the fintech lender—prevent this perverse effect of open
banking on borrowers from happening? After all, borrowers will not act against their own interest.
Our analysis with voluntary sign-up decisions provides a negative answer to this question. We
show that provided that there exist some borrowers who never sign up due to prohibitively high
sign-up costs (e.g., because they do not know how to use the new technology or have strong
privacy concerns), generically there exists a non-empty set of parameters under which in the only
(nontrivial) equilibrium, proportionally more high-type borrowers sign up and all borrowers are
left strictly worse off compared to the regime of before open banking. Those who sign up suffer
due to weakened competition as a result of the enlarged lender asymmetry caused by data sharing;
those who do not suffer due to an adverse equilibrium inference that opting-out signals poor credit
quality.
Section 4 studies data sharing on customer preference privacy. We assume that borrowers are
subject to some random shocks under which they can only take the fintech’s loan. For instance,
they happen to need a quick loan and only the fintech can process with “immediacy”; or they have
reached the bank’s borrowing limit and so can only resort to the fintech. Open banking, with the
aid of big data technology that can integrate, say, borrowers’ social data and digital footprints
together with their bank account information, allows the fintech to identify these “privacy events.”
Accordingly, the fintech can better take advantage of borrowers by performing precision marketing,
or in other words, “delivering the right offer at the right time to the right customer.”4 To highlight
the effect of privacy events, we assume that open banking in this case does not enhance the fintech’s
ability to screen the credit quality of borrowers. The borrowers in privacy events resemble the
“captured” consumers in Varian (1980) who consider only one seller’s offer.
When the probability of privacy events is sufficiently small, the small pool of captured borrowers
is not enough to compensate the loss from the winner’s curse for the fintech lender, which has an
inferior screening ability. Similar to the baseline model, the fintech hence earns a zero profit in
equilibrium and sometimes does not make offers to borrowers with a good signal. Its profit from
captured borrowers is offset by the bank’s more aggressive bidding. (This is different from Varian
(1980) where any firm with some captured consumers must earn a positive profit.) Open banking
4Transaction records from the borrower’s bank allow fintech lenders to infer the borrower’s more detailed demo-
graphic and credit information, by analyzing, say, the income and occupation revealed from direct deposits, consump-
tion habit, and other information. This inference, combined with browsing and location data and their much shorter
loan application processing time, allows fintech lenders to assess and meet the borrower’s demand of “immediacy”—
e.g., borrowers traveling abroad need loans in foreign currencies on the spot, or consumers on e-commerce platforms
with impulse purchase needs.
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allows the fintech to identify borrowers in privacy events and charge them a monopoly interest rate.
If there were no credit quality inference from sign-up decisions, high-type borrowers would opt out
to avoid paying a predatory interest rate in privacy events, while the opposite holds for low-type
borrowers who repay much less often and hence care little about the interest rate. Due to this
stigma effect of associating signing up with low credit quality, nobody signs up in equilibrium after
open banking.
On the contrary, when the probability of privacy events is sufficiently large, the results are rather
different. Before open banking, thanks to a large pool of potential captured borrowers, the fintech
now earns a positive profit and always makes an offer upon a good signal. This is particularly
attractive to the low-type who only care about the chance of getting a loan—in fact, they never
sign up for open banking to reveal privacy events. This leads to a favorable credit quality inference
for signing-up, leading all high-type borrowers to sign up in equilibrium. Piecing this together with
the previous case, we predict a rising sign-up population or widespread open-banking adoption
when the probability of privacy events increases. This perhaps counterintuitive result is driven by
the signaling effect of sign-up decisions.
In the case of data sharing on preference based privacy, in terms of the impact on borrower
welfare, we have a similar result as in the case of data sharing on credit quality information.
That is, it is possible that all borrowers suffer from open banking in equilibrium. This happens
for an intermediate probability of privacy events, and again this is because sign-up decisions are
intertwined with credit quality inference in equilibrium. Loosely speaking, those who sign up suffer
due to being exploited in privacy events;5 those who do not suffer due to an unfavorable credit
quality inference.
Related Literature
Lending market competition with asymmetric information. Our paper is built on Broecker (1990),
which studies lending market competition with screening tests. In Broecker (1990), banks are sym-
metric and possess the same screening ability, while both our paper and Hauswald and Marquez
(2003) consider asymmetric screening abilities.6 Hauswald and Marquez (2003) study the com-
petition between an inside bank who can conduct credit screening and an outside bank who has
no access to screening. They consider the possibility of information spillover to the outside bank,
which reduces the inside bank’s information advantage and benefits borrowers. When open bank-
ing facilitates sharing data on customer credit quality, it has some connection to the information
5Compared to opting out, signing up for open banking makes high-type borrowers to be exploited by a monopoly
interest rate in the privacy event, whereas low-type borrowers are more likely to lose the chance of receiving a loan
offer in the non-privacy event.
6Lending market competition with asymmetric screening abilities is related to common-value auctions with asym-
metrically informed bidders. The early papers include Milgrom andWeber (1982) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom,
and Weber (1983); later papers such as Hausch (1987), Kagel and Levin (1999), and Banerjee (2005) explore informa-
tion structures that allow each bidder to have some private information (which is the information structure adopted in
Broecker (1990) and our paper). The common-valuation auction literature suggests that reducing the more-informed
bidder’s information advantage tends to intensify competition and improve the seller’s revenue, a result emerging in
our baseline model as well.
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spillover effect studied in Hauswald and Marquez (2003).
Our paper differs from Hauswald and Marquez (2003) in three important aspects: First, in
our model, open banking can empower the fintech, the initial weak lender, so that it exceeds the
traditional bank in screening ability, which can harm all borrowers. Second, an important feature
of open banking, which we highlight in this paper, is that customers have the control of whether
to share their data, and their sign-up decision itself can potentially reveal further creditworthiness
information. Third, open banking can also reveal non-credit privacy information to the fintech
lender. How this enables the fintech to make more targeted loan offers and affects lending market
competition has not been investigated in the literature.
Asymmetric credit market competition can also arise from the bank-firm relationship, as a
bank knows its existing customers better than a new competitor; this idea was explored by Sharpe
(1990).7 In our model, information asymmetry before open banking exists for the same reason:
traditional banks own the customer data that fintech lenders have no access to, so that even if
fintech lenders have a better data processing algorithm, they screen borrowers less accurately.
Our paper is also related to the literature on credit information sharing among banks; e.g.,
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and Bouckaert and Degryse (2006).8 More broadly, lending market
competition with asymmetric information is important for studying many issues such as capital
requirement (e.g., Thakor, 1996), borrowers’ incentives to improve project quality (e.g., Rajan,
1992), information dispersion and relationship building (e.g., Marquez, 2002), credit allocation
(e.g., Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004, 2006), etc.
Fintechs. Our paper connects to the growing literature on fintech disruption (see, for instance,
Vives, 2019, for a review of digital disruption in banking), in particular on fintech companies
competing with traditional banks in originating loans.9 Berg, Burg, Gombović, and Puri (2020) find
that even simple digital footprints are informative in predicting consumer default, as a complement
source of information to traditional credit bureau scores. On studies that support the notion of
a competition relationship between fintech and bank in our paper, Fuster, Plosser, Schnabl, and
Vickery (2019) examine the mortgage market and provide evidence that fintech lenders’ technology
advantage increases origination efficiency: the automated fintech lending system results in faster
processing and more elastic response to changes in borrower demand. Di Maggio and Yao (2020)
7In the two-period model analyzed in Sharpe (1990), asymmetric competition arises in the second period. The
corrected analysis of the second-period competition with a mixed-strategy equilibrium is offered in Von Thadden
(2004).
8These two papers differ from ours in terms of focus as well as framework. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) study a
collective decision on information sharing among banks (e.g., by setting up a credit bureau) where each bank acts as
a monopolist in a local market. A bank can tell its residential borrowers’ types and so offers type-dependent deals,
but it does not know the types of borrowers who immigrate from other markets and so has to offer them a uniform
interest rate. Once customer information is shared, each bank can discriminate over different types of immigrant
borrowers as well. Bouckaert and Degryse (2006) study banks’ individual incentives to share customer information.
They argue that an incumbent bank has a strategic incentive to share partial customer information to reduce the
entry of new competitors. In our paper, the sharing of bank customer data to the fintech is faciliated by open banking
regulation and importantly is controlled by customers themselves.
9Blockchain and its underlying distributed ledger technology are another important disruption force in today’s
financial industry that has received great attention since the launch of Bitcoin. For related work on this topic, see
He and Cong (2019); Biais, BisiÃšre, Bouvard, and Casamatta (2019) and Abadi and Brunnermeier (2019).
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find that fintech lenders serve borrowers of decent credit quality by financing higher consumption
expenditures, who then default ex post more frequently than similar borrowers with non-fintech
lenders. Their paper suggests a story in which some borrowers’ desire for immediate consumption
with fintech loans exacerbates their self-control issues to overborrow, a point that is consistent
with one interpretation of the captured customers that we study in Section 4.10 In related theory
work, Parlour, Rajan, and Zhu (2020) study a bank that operates in both payment service and
credit (loan) markets; the bank is a monopoly lender in the loan market, but competes with
stand-alone fintechs on payment service. Parlour, Rajan, and Zhu (2020) stress that customers’
payment services provide information about their credit quality. In their paper, customers know
that switching their payment service to fintechs has consequences on their credit service (akin to
borrowers’ data-sharing decisions in our model), but there is no equilibrium credit quality inference,
which plays the key role in our analysis.11
Consumer privacy. Our paper also contributes to the burgeoning literature on consumer privacy
(see, for instance, Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman, 2016; Bergemann and Bonatti, 2019, for re-
cent surveys), and is particularly related to work on the impact of letting consumers control their
own data. Recent research suggests that the market equilibrium consequence of consumer privacy
choices is highly context dependent. For example, in a general equilibrium setup Jones and Tonetti
(2020) argue that consumer data ownership often leads to broader data usage than in the case of
firm ownership, improving welfare thanks to the non-rivalry of data use. Ichihashi (2020) considers
a multi-product monopoly problem where consumers choose whether to share data about their
preferences, which can be used by the seller for both product recommendations and price discrimi-
nation.12 Liu, Sockin, and Xiong (2020) examine the implications of consumer privacy when there
is both a normal consumption good and a temptation good; data sharing shapes sellers’ marketing
schemes for reaching target consumers, which improve the efficiency of the normal good but also
induce some behaviorally biased consumers to overconsume the temptation good.13
We contribute to this literature by studying consumer privacy choices in the lending market.
With the interaction between credit quality information and preference information, our paper
10Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018) study the mortgage market and argue that banking regulation and
technology advancement contributed to the significant growth of fintech lenders. Tang (2019) uses a regulatory change
that contracts bank credit as an exogenous shock and finds that P2P platforms substitutes with bank in the consumer
credit market.
11Whether a consumer switches the payment service to fintechs is driven by her bank-affinity preference, which is
assumed to be independent of her credit quality type.
12Ichihashi (2020) shows that the seller has an incentive to commit to not price discriminate to encourage consumer
information sharing, but this can harm consumers in equilibrium because the firm may set a higher uniform price
anticipating better a match between consumers and products. Ali, Lewis, and Vasserman (2020) study a related
problem but in a different setup with single-product firms and argue that sharing preference information with firms
can benefit consumers by amplifying price competition.
13Liu, Sockin, and Xiong (2020) emphasizes the difference between two consumer privacy regulations, namely
GDPR in EU (opt-out as the default choice) and CCPA in California (opt-in as the default choice). Our study of
privacy and targeted loans in Section 4 is also related to the literature on oligopolistic price discrimination (see,
for instance, the survey by Stole, 2007). In our model only the fintech lender can make targeted offers, so there
is asymmetric oligopolistic price discrimination. Two major differences relative to this IO literature are: our credit
market competition features the winner’s curse; in our model, consumers choose whether to disclose their preference
information, rather than firms deciding whether to acquire consumer information.
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highlights the equilibrium inference from consumers’ sign-up decisions in open banking. Using data
from an online travel intermediary, Aridor, Che, and Salz (2020) offer evidence that this type of
inference is well founded. They show that letting privacy-conscious consumers opt out of data
sharing under GDPR increases the average value of the remaining consumers to advertisers.
2 The Baseline Model
This section introduces the basic model of credit market competition that will be used as a building
block in later sections when we study open banking. Table 1 in Appendix A.1 provides a detailed
list of the notation used in this paper. All proofs are found in the Appendix.
2.1 Borrowers
There is a continuum of risk-neutral borrowers of measure one. Each is looking for a loan that is
normalized to be 1. Borrowers differ in their default risk: a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of them are high-type
(h) borrowers who will repay the loan with probability µh ∈ (0, 1], and the rest 1 − θ of them are
low-type (l) borrowers who will repay the loan with probability µl < µh. Each borrower’s type is
that borrower’s private information, but the type distribution is publicly known. Let
τ ≡ θ1− θ
be the likelihood ratio of high-type over low-type borrowers in the population, which represents the
average credit quality in the market.
We assume that the interest rate in the market never exceeds r. There are at least two interpre-
tations of this assumption. Borrowers can be small business firms, each having a project in which
to invest but differing in the probability that their project will succeed. When the project succeeds,
it yields a net return r, which is observable and contractible; when it fails, it yields nothing. As a
result, borrowers will never accept a loan with an interest rate above r. Alternatively, borrowers
can be ordinary consumers who need a loan to purchase a product but differ in the probability
that they will be able to repay the loan. (For instance, a consumer will default if she becomes
unemployed, and consumers face different unemployment risks.) In this case we assume that the
utility from consuming the product is sufficiently high for each type of consumer,14 but the interest
rate is capped at r either due to interest rate regulation (e.g., usury laws) that prohibits excessively
high rates of interest,15 or because of some exogenous outside options.
14In this case, for a borrower of type i ∈ {h, l}, denote by ui the utility from consuming the product. We assume
that δi ≡ ui − µi (1 + r) ≥ 0 so that both types of consumers are willing to borrower at interest rate r. Also see
related discussions toward the end of Section 2.3.
15Usury laws prohibit lenders from charging borrowers excessively high interest rates on loans. In the U.S., many
states have established caps on the interest rate that lenders can charge for small dollar loans, such as payday and
auto-title products. See, for instance, https://bit.ly/3mhJn2b for details.
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2.2 Lenders and Screening Ability
There are two risk-neutral competing lenders in the market. When a borrower applies for a loan,
each lender conducts an independent creditworthiness test before deciding whether to make an
offer. We are interested in the case when one lender has a better screening ability than the other.
As we emphasized in the introduction, screening ability includes both data availability and the
data processing technique/algorithm. We call one of the lenders a strong lender (denoted by s)
and the other a weak lender (denoted by w). When it comes to the open banking applications in
next sections, the two lenders will be a traditional bank and a fintech lender, which differ in their
screening ability.
Following Broecker (1990), we assume that each lender receives an independent and private
signal of a borrower’s type via a credit screening. Let Sj ∈ {H,L} denote lender j’s signal, where
j ∈ {s, w}. Lender j’s screening features a signal structure
P(Sj = H|h) = xhj , P(Sj = L|l) = xlj ,
with xis > xiw, i ∈ {h, l}. That is, when a borrower is of high type, lender j will receive a high signal
H with probability xhj and a low signal L with probability 1−xhj ; when the borrower is of low type,







represents lender j’s screening ability, which is publicly known and measures the
informativeness of lender j’s signal.16 In the following, we use high (low) signals and good (bad)
signals exchangeably.
After receiving their private signals, the lenders update their beliefs about the borrower’s type
and make their loan offers rj ∈ [0, r] (if any) simultaneously. The borrower will choose the offer
with the lower interest rate. (When the two lenders offer the same deal, suppose the borrower will
randomly pick one offer, though the details of the tie-breaking rule do not affect our analysis.) For
simplicity, we assume that the two lenders have the same funding costs which we normalize to 1.17
2.3 Simplifications
To reduce the number of parameters without losing our main insights, we simplify the model by
assuming: (i) µl = 0 and µh = 1. That is, a low-type borrower never repays a loan while a high-type
borrower always repays;18 (ii) xhs = xhw = 1. That is, to either lender, a high-type borrower always
yields a good signal, so we have a “bad-news” signal structure. In other words, in our model a bad
signal perfectly reveals that a borrower is of low type (and so no lender will lend to a borrower
16Broecker (1990) considers a general number of lenders with symmetric screening abilities, while we consider a
duopoly case with asymmetric screening abilities.
17When it comes to open banking applications, we could alternatively assume that the fintech lender has a higher
financing cost than the traditional bank. The fintech’s disadvantageous position in financing cost is a well-known
empirical regularity, because of their lack of cheap and stable funding sources like deposits. However, considering
asymmetric funding costs only complicates the analysis without adding significant economic insight given our focus.
18Although low-type borrowers always default, we assume that they prefer a cheaper loan, which can be justified
if µl is slightly above zero.
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with a bad signal), while a good signal is inconclusive. From now on, we let
xs = xls > xw = xlw,
which summarizes the two lenders’ screening abilities.
We assume that each lender is willing to lend to a borrower with a high signal H at the highest
possible interest rate r. The details of this assumption are as follows. For lender j, the chance that
it will see a high signal from a borrower is θ + (1 − θ)(1 − xj). Given µl = 1 and µh = 0, upon
seeing a high signal it expects a repayment rate
θ
θ + (1− θ) (1− xj)
= τ
τ + 1− xj
,
where recall τ = θ1−θ . The lender is willing to lend at r = r if this expected repayment rate times
1 + r is greater than the cost 1. This requires
τr > 1− xj . (1)
This is easier to hold when there are more high-type borrowers in the population, i.e., a higher τ , or
when the screening ability is better. This assumption, together with the bad-news signal structure,
implies that in our model the only mistake lenders may make is lending to a low-type borrower.
Finally, we assume that any borrower of type i obtains a non-monetary benefit δi just from
getting a loan. For high-type borrowers, they are left with some endogenous rent thanks to lender
competition. We hence normalize δh to 0 for convenience as δh plays no role in our subsequent
analyses. We, however, set δl = δ > 0. In the context of small business loans, δ can be interpreted
as the control rent of entrepreneurs from non-pledgeable income (see, for instance, Tirole, 2010),
so that low-type borrowers who never succeed still care about the likelihood of getting a loan. This
makes low-type borrowers’ welfare meaningful, and for our applications we think about the control
rent δ as relatively small.19
2.4 Equilibrium Characterization
We solve the model in closed-form in this section by fully characterizing the unique (mixed-strategy)
equilibrium for credit market competition.
2.4.1 Preliminary analysis
Let
pHH ≡ P (Ss = H,Sw = H) = θ + (1− θ) (1− xs) (1− xw)
19For the interpretation of consumption loans, δ then represents the low-type borrowers’ utility from consuming
the product given µl = 0. Following the discussion in footnote 14, we only need δ ≥ 0 so δ can be arbitrarily small.
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be the probability of repayment of a borrower conditional on that. Similarly, denote by
pHL ≡ P (Ss = H,Sw = L) = (1− θ) (1− xs)xw
the probability that the strong lender observes a good signal but the weak one observes a bad
signal, and by
pLH ≡ P (Ss = L, Sw = H) = (1− θ)xs (1− xw)
the probability that the stronger observes a bad signal but the weak one observes a good signal. In
either case, the expected repayment probability is zero. Note that pLH > pHL given that xs > xw.
The credit market competition in our model has a flavor of common-value auctions. A lender
wins a borrower if it offers a better interest rate than its rival, or if the rival does not make an
offer at all, which happens when it sees a bad signal. Hence, winning the borrower brings some
bad news—a winner’s curse. More precisely, suppose that the two lenders offer the same interest
rate r ≤ r. Then the strong lender’s profit, for instance, is
pHH ×
1
2 [µHH (1 + r)− 1]− pHL︸︷︷︸
winner’s curse
. (2)
When both observe a good signal from a borrower (which occurs with probability pHH), the strong
lender wins the borrower with probability 1/2; when the strong lender observes a good signal but
the weak one observes a bad signal (which occurs with probability pHL), the former wins for sure
but in that case the borrower must be of low type and so will never repay the loan.
Due to this winner’s curse, it is easy to see that in our model there is no pure-strategy equi-
librium.20 As shown in the Online Appendix B.1, any mixed-strategy equilibrium in our model is
well behaved. Let mj , j ∈ {s, w}, be lender j’s probability that it makes an offer to a borrower
upon seeing a good signal. (As we will see, in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the strong lender
will always make an offer after seeing a good signal, while the weak lender will sometimes not make
an offer.) Let Fj (r) ≡ Pr (rj ≤ r) be lender j’s interest rate distribution conditional on making an
offer, and as shown in Appendix B.1, the two lenders’ distributions must share the same support
with common lower bound r (which will be specified below) and upper bound r. For our subsequent
analysis, it is more convenient to use the survival function F j(r) ≡ 1−Fj(r). Let πj be the lender
j’s equilibrium (expected) profit.
20It is impossible that the two lenders offer different interest rates; otherwise the lender offering a lower interest
rate could always raise its interest rate slightly without losing any demand. If they charge the same interest rate and
make a nonnegative profit, then the first portion in (2) must be strictly positive, in which case each lender will have
a unilateral incentive to undercut its opponent.
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[µHH (1 + r)− 1]− pHL = πs. (3)
When the strong lender offers interest rate r upon seeing a good signal, there are two possibilities: if
the weak lender also observes a good signal (which occurs with probability pHH), the strong lender
wins if the weak one does not make an offer (which occurs with probability 1−mw) or if the weak
one makes an offer but its interest rate is above r (which occurs with probability mwFw(r)); if the
weak lender observes a bad signal instead (which occurs with probability pHL) and hence makes
no offer, the borrower must be of low type and so the strong lender make a loss of 1. Similarly, the
weak lender’s indifference condition is
pHH
[
1−ms +msF s (r)
]
[µHH(1 + r)− 1]− pLH = πw. (4)
Lemma 1. In any mixed-strategy equilibrium, the strong lender makes a strictly positive profit
πs > 0 while the weak lender makes a zero profit πw = 0.
This is because the weak lender faces a higher lending cost due to its more severe winner’s
curse (i.e., pLH > pHL). Given that there is no product differentiation, only the lender with the
lower cost makes a positive profit. As we will see below, the strong lender’s profit actually equals
pLH − pHL = (1− θ) (xs − xw).
2.4.2 Mixed-strategy competition equilibrium
Now we fully characterize the mixed-strategy equilibrium with πs > πw = 0. The strong lender
must always make an offer upon seeing a good signal (i.e., ms = 1) because of its strictly positive
profit. Equation (4) then simplifies to
pHHF s (r) [µHH (1 + r)− 1]− pLH = 0. (5)
To make this equation hold for r close to r, we need Fs to have a mass point at the top. Let
λs ≡ lim
r↑r
F j (r) ∈ [0, 1) be the size of the mass point. (This also implies that the support of Fw
must be open at the top.) From (3) and (5), we can uniquely solve for all four endogenous variables
(r, πs,mw, λs) and the two distributions. For notational convenience, we define
φ (r) ≡ pLH
pHH [µHH (1 + r)− 1]
= xsτ
1−xw r − 1 + xs
, (6)
which is F s(r) solving (5). Note that φ (r) depends on primitive parameters xw, xs, and τ .
Denote by ∆ the gap in screening ability between the two lenders:
∆ ≡ xs − xw.
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One can also check that 1− φ (r) > 0 from assumption (1), which implies that φ (r) ∈ (0, 1). Then
the mixed-strategy equilibrium is characterized as follows:
Proposition 1. The competition between the two lenders has a unique equilibrium in which:
1. the strong lender makes a profit πs = ∆1+τ and the weak lender makes a zero profit πw = 0;
2. the strong lender always makes an offer upon seeing a high signal (ms = 1), and its interest
rate is randomly drawn from the distribution F s(r) = φ(r), which has support [r, r] with
r = 1−xwτ and has a mass point of size λs = φ (r) at r; and
3. the weak lender makes an offer with probability mw = 1−φ (r) upon seeing a high signal, and
when it makes an offer the interest rate is randomly drawn from the distribution
Fw (r) =
φ (r)− φ (r)
1− φ (r) ,
which has support [r, r).
When τ goes to ∞ (i.e., when there is no default risk in the market), as expected the equilib-
rium smoothly converges to the Bertrand equilibrium where both lenders offer r = 0. One useful
observation is that for r ∈ [r, r), the two distributions satisfy
Fs (r) = mwFw (r) . (7)
Since mw = 1 − φ (r) < 1, this means the strong lender charges an interest rate higher than the
weak lender in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Intuitively, the weak lender
knows that its screening ability is relatively low and a good signal is not convincing enough to
determine that the borrower is of high type, and so it chooses not to lend sometimes. As a result,
the strong lender sometimes acts as a monopoly credit supplier and charges a higher interest rate.
The following result reports how each lender’s screening ability and average credit quality affect
the competition.
Corollary 1. In the competition equilibrium,
1. when the screening ability gap ∆ increases or the average credit quality τ decreases, the strong
lender’s profit (which is also the industry profit) increases; and
2. when the strong lender’s screening ability xs improves, or the weaker lender’s screening ability
xw deteriorates, or the average credit quality τ decreases, both lenders charge a higher interest
rate in the sense of FOSD, and the weak lender makes an offer less frequently conditional on
seeing a high signal.
This result suggests that the winner’s curse is the key driver of the degree of competition in our
model. When the screening ability gap ∆ is larger, the winner’s curse becomes more asymmetric
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between the two lenders, which softens competition. When the average credit quality τ is smaller,
the winner’s curse for each lender becomes more severe, which also weakens competition.
Before leaving this section, we point out that Proposition 1 applies to the (generic) case of
xs > xw. However, the edge case xs = xw is slightly trickier. There are two asymmetric equilibria
(which are the continuous limits of the equilibrium in Proposition 1), depending on which lender
always makes an offer upon seeing a good signal. There is also a symmetric equilibrium where
neither lender always makes an offer upon seeing a good signal (i.e., ms = mw < 1). Lenders make
a zero profit in any of these equilibria, but borrowers prefer the two asymmetric equilibria because
there they are more likely to get a loan. For this reason, whenever this edge case matters, we focus
on the asymmetric equilibria.
2.5 Borrower Surplus
The surplus of each type of borrowers is important for our subsequent analysis. Let Vi (xw, xs, τ)
denote the expected surplus of an i-type borrower, i ∈ {h, l}, as a function of the two lenders’
screening abilities and the average credit quality in the market.
A high-type borrower receives at least one offer (from the strong lender) and so always get a
loan. The expected interest rate she pays is given by
(1−mw)E [rs] +mwE [min (rw, rs)] = r + (r − r)φ (r) , (8)
where φ (·) is defined as in (6). Here, when the weak lender does not make an offer, the borrower
accepts the strong lender’s offer; when both make offers, the borrower chooses the cheaper one. The
equality comes from using E [rs] = r +
∫ r
r F s (r) dr and E [min (rw, rs)] = r +
∫ r
r F s (r)Fw (r) dr.
Then a high-type borrower’s expected surplus is
Vh (xw, xs, τ) = (r − r) (1− φ (r)) . (9)
It is the high-type’s pecuniary payoff from the project and equals r net of the expected interest
rate in (8).
Since a low-type borrower never pays back her loan, she cares only about the chance of getting
a loan. A low-type borrower will not receive any offer if the strong lender observes a bad signal
and at the same time the weak lender either observes a bad signal or observes a good signal but
does not make an offer. This occurs with probability xs [xw + (1− xw) (1−mw)]. Therefore, given
mw = 1− φ (r), a low-type borrower’s expected surplus is
Vl (xw, xs, τ) = δ [1− xs (xw + (1− xw)φ (r))] , (10)
where δ is the low-type’s non-monetary benefit from getting a loan as we have introduced before
for the low-type borrower.
For our open banking applications, it is important to understand how each lender’s screening
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ability affects borrower surplus.
Proposition 2. Both types of borrower benefit from a higher average credit quality τ in the market.
Regarding screening ability, both types of borrower suffer due to a higher screening ability of the
strong lender (i.e., a higher xs); high-type borrowers also benefit from a higher screening ability of
the weaker lender (i.e., a higher xw), but low-type borrowers benefit from a higher screening ability
of the weaker lender (i.e., a higher xw) if and only if rr < 1 +
√
xs.
The first result is straightforward from Corollary 1: A higher average credit quality lessens the
winner’s curse and so intensifies competition, and it also increases the chance that the weak lender
makes an offer upon seeing a good signal. The high-type benefit from both effects and the low-type
benefits from the second.
The intuition for the second result is as follows: When xs is improved, the screening ability
gap ∆ widens and this softens competition, and at the same time, the weak lender makes an offer
less likely as it faces a more severe winner’s curse. The high type suffers due to both effects and
the low-type suffers due to the second. On the other hand, when xw is improved, the ability gap
∆ shrinks and this intensifies competition, and at the same time the weak lender is more likely to
make an offer upon seeing a good signal (but for a low type borrower, the chance of generating a
good signal declines). The high type benefits from both effects and the low type can be ambiguously
affected by the second effect.
In general, a change in screening ability brings about an informational effect, which enhances
the screening efficiency; and a strategic pricing effect that affects the equilibrium interest rate as
well as the likelihood of a loan offer from the weak lender upon a good signal.21 These two effects
can be more clearly seen if we rewrite the borrower surplus in the parameter space {xw,∆, τ}, in
which case xw is regarded as some base screening ability for both lenders, as formally stated in
the next corollary. When xw increases, both lenders’ screening abilities improve, and intuitively
this should benefit the high type and harm the low type. On the other hand, a widening of the
screening ability gap ∆ worsens the winner’s curse problem, and this has a strategic pricing effect
which lessens competition and impairs the welfare of borrowers.
Corollary 2. Once expressed as functions of {xw,∆, τ}, Vh increases while Vl decreases in the
base screening ability xw, and both Vh and Vl decrease in the screening ability gap ∆.
3 Open Banking: Credit Information Sharing
From now on, we consider a competition between a traditional bank (denoted by b) and a f intech
lender (denoted by f). We assume that before open banking regulation, the bank is better at
screening borrowers because of its rich data from existing bank-customer relationships. More
21In our setup with µh = 1 and µl = 0, the first informational effect vanishes for the high-type borrowers since they
always generate a good signal, and the interest rate effect in strategic pricing vanishes for the low-type borrowers
since they never repay the loan.
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specifically, let xj , j ∈ {b, f}, be lender j’s screening ability. We assume xf < xb before open
banking. After open banking, if the fintech has access to customer data from the bank, we assume
that its screening ability improves significantly to x′f so that it exceeds the traditional bank’s ability
xb. This is because, for example, the fintech is often equipped with more advanced technology to
make use of the data, or it has some additional customer information (e.g., from social media) that
complements the bank data. Therefore, in this section we assume
xf < xb < x
′
f . (11)
We aim to examine the welfare impacts of open banking and will mainly focus on the possibility
that open banking has a perverse effect on borrowers. In the following, we first consider the case
when the data sharing is mandatory (i.e., the data will be shared even without customers’ consent),
and then consider the case of voluntary sign-up for data sharing as it works in practice.
3.1 Mandatory Sign-up
Suppose that all borrowers are required to sign up for open banking. This improves the fintech’s
screening ability, but it does not cause market segmentation since all borrowers have to share their
data and so the lenders’ prior beliefs of the average credit quality remain unchanged. This is not
the practice of open banking regulation, but it is a useful benchmark.




1+τ , and the fintech earns a zero profit; after open banking, the fintech becomes the
strong lender and earns a positive profit ∆′1+τ =
x′f−xb
1+τ , and the bank earns a zero profit. Therefore,
open banking increases industry profit if and only if it widens the screening ability gap between
the two lenders (i.e. if ∆′ > ∆).
Open banking increases the weak lender’s screening ability from xf to xb and may expand
or shrink the screening ability gap between the two lenders. So its impact on borrowers is less







Vi (xf , xb, τ). (Recall that the first dependent variable in the borrower surplus function is the weak
lender’s screening ability.) Proposition 2 implies that for a fixed xb, (i) Vh increases in xf < xb but
decreases in xf > xb, and (ii) Vl can vary with xf < xb non-monotonically but must decrease in
xf > xb. Figure 1 depicts a numerical example of how Vh (Panel A) and Vl (Panel B) vary with xf
for xb = 0.5.
Therefore, if xf is sufficiently close to xb before open banking and x′f is sufficiently above xb after
open banking, both types of borrowers suffer from open banking. In other words, open banking is
detrimental to all borrowers if it causes a significantly larger new asymmetry between lenders. It
is also useful to think of the borrower surplus problem from the perspective of the base screening
ability xw and the ability gap ∆ as in Corollary 2. Open banking improves the base screening
ability, which benefits the high type but harms the low type. Hence, the high type will suffer from
open banking only if it widens the gap (i.e. if ∆′ > ∆), in which case the low type must suffer from
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Figure 1: Borrower Surpluses when Fintech Screening Ability Varies
Panel A plots the high-type borrower surplus Vh (xb, xf , τ) and Panel B plots the low-type borrower
surplus Vl (xb, xf , τ), both as functions of the fintech lender’s screening ability xf . The high-type borrower
surplus Vh (xb, xf , τ) is single-peaked at xf = xb (hence ∆ = 0) while Vl (xb, xf , τ) is hump-shaped in the
range of xf < xb. Parameter values are r = 1, xb = 0.5, δ = 0.5, and τ = 1.1.
open banking while industry profit must be boosted.
In our setup, high-type borrowers always get a loan in either regime, implying that open banking
is efficiency neutral to these borrowers. Low-type borrowers’ surplus is proportional to the chance
that they get a loan, and so whenever they suffer from open banking, it must be that these low-type
borrowers are less likely to get a loan, which improves the market efficiency if there is an efficiency
loss associated with them (which is the case as long as the low-type private benefit of receiving a
loan δ < 1).
The above discussion is summarized in the following result:
Proposition 3. Compared to the regime before open banking,
1. for a fixed xb < 1, there exist x̂f < xb < x̂′f such that open banking with mandatory data
sharing harms all borrowers if xf ∈ [x̂f , xb] and x′f ≥ x̂′f ; and
2. open banking with mandatory data sharing helps the fintech but harms the bank, and whenever
it harms all borrowers, it improves industry profit and market efficiency (if a low-type borrower
generates an efficiency loss whenever she gets a loan).
Here we have focused on the potential perverse effect of open banking on borrowers. Of course,




We now turn to the more realistic and also more interesting case when signing up for open banking
is voluntary. Complying with the principles of GDPR in the EU (i.e., it is the customers, not the
bank or the firm more generally, who own their personal data), the UK open banking regulation
gives consumers the right to decide whether to allow fintech firms to access their personal banking
data. But does this voluntary sign-up necessarily imply that consumers never get hurt? Consumers’
sign-up decisions may reveal information on their credit quality, and this endogenous credit quality
inference will influence the lenders’ pricing strategies. As a result, it is ex ante unclear that open
banking with voluntary sign-up always helps consumers.
To facilitate our analysis where the equilibrium credit quality inference plays a key role, when-
ever we study the voluntary sign-up equilibrium, we suppose that borrowers have heterogeneous
sign-up costs for open banking. More specifically, a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1) of borrowers, whom we
call “non--tech-savvy,” face an infinite sign-up cost and hence never sign up in equilibrium, while
the remaining 1 − ρ of borrowers, whom we call “tech-savvy,” have a zero sign-up cost and their
sign-up decisions will be our focus. The sign-up cost is borrowers’ private information, and for
model parsimony, we assume it is independent of their credit quality type.
Although we label them based on “tech-savviness”, we emphasize that the distribution of sign-
up costs captures a wide range of heterogeneity among open banking customers. For instance,
some consumers are technology savvy, so that they not only “understand” the concepts of how
technology works but also willing to “encompass” the utilization of such modern technology; some
consumers may deeply worry about the security of sharing their own data due to some unpleasant
personal experience. Our analysis does not depend on the exact interpretation of the sign-up cost.
3.2.1 Sign-up decisions and equilibrium
Let σi ∈ [0, 1], for i ∈ {h, l}, be the fraction of i-type tech-savvy borrowers who choose to sign
up for open banking. Throughout, we use the two words “opt in” and “sign up” interchangeably
(hence, “opt out” is equivalent to “not sign up”).
Consistent with open banking in practice, we assume that a borrower’s sign-up decision is
observable to both lenders.22 Then the two lenders compete in two separate market segments: one
where borrowers sign up for open banking, and the other where borrowers do not. Let τ+ and τ− be
respectively the lenders’ updated prior on the average credit quality in the two market segments.
Specifically, τ+ ≡
Pr[h|sign up]








Intuitively, when high-type tech-savvy borrowers are more likely to sign up for open banking, the
lenders raise their estimate of the average credit quality in the opt-in segment but lower their
22The fintech of course observes the sign-up decision. It is also easy for the traditional bank to monitor borrowers’
sign-up decisions since in practice the fintech needs to use the API provided by the bank to access the customer data.
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estimate in the other.
Anticipating the equilibrium sign-up decisions in the population and the subsequent competition
outcome in each market segment, an i-type borrower’s sign-up decision is governed by:
σi = 1, if Vi(xb, x′f , τ+) > Vi(xf , xb, τ−),
σi ∈ [0, 1] , if Vi(xb, x′f , τ+) = Vi(xf , xb, τ−),
σi = 0, if Vi(xb, x′f , τ+) < Vi(xf , xb, τ−).
(13)
If a borrower chooses to sign up, she will be classified in the market segment characterized by
(xb, x′f , τ+) where the fintech becomes the strong lender; otherwise, she will be classified in the
market segment characterized by (xf , xb, τ−) where the fintech remains as the weak lender. Note
also that the surplus of an i-type non–tech-savvy borrower is Vi(xf , xb, τ−), since she never signs
up for open banking.
An equilibrium with voluntary sign-up is a collection of
{













together with some off-equilibrium beliefs whenever appropriate, so that (i) {σi} are the sign-up
decisions of tech-savvy borrowers described in (13), (ii) {τ+, τ−} are the lenders’ updated prior of











are the lenders’ equilibrium pricing strategies described in Proposition 1 respectively
in the sign-up market segment characterized by (xb, x′f , τ+) and in the opt-out market segment
characterized by (xf , xb, τ−).
Although we do not intend to fully characterize all possible equilibria for the whole range of
parameters, we can rule out some types of equilibria immediately. First, it is impossible to have
an equilibrium where signing up perfectly reveals the borrower type. This is the case when only
high-type borrowers sign up (i.e., σl = 0 and σh > 0), or when only low-type borrowers sign up
(i.e., σl > 0 and σh = 0). In the former case, a low-type borrower has an incentive to deviate and
sign up so that she will be treated as a high-type borrower and so get a loan for sure; in the latter
case, a low-type borrower who signs up will never get a loan and so she has an incentive to deviate.
Second, the following lemma rules out the equilibrium where both types of borrowers are indifferent
about whether to sign up or not. Intuitively, high-type borrowers are not afraid of a more precise
screening technology, and so they are more willing to sign up than low-type borrowers.
Lemma 2. If low-type tech-savvy borrowers are indifferent between signing up or not, then high-type
tech-savvy borrowers must strictly prefer to sign up.
There is always an equilibrium in which nobody signs up for open banking, if we assign a
sufficiently unfavorable off-equilibrium belief to whoever signs up for open banking.23 But this
equilibrium is trivial in the sense that open banking has no impact at all on borrowers and lenders.
In the following, we ignore this uninteresting equilibrium. Another possible simple equilibrium is
23If the condition in Proposition 3 holds (i.e. when mandatory sign-up makes all borrowers worse off), the off-
equilibrium belief can be just the prior τ . This can be justified, for example, if there are some fintech lovers (with
the same credit quality distribution as the entire population) who always sign up for open banking.
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that all tech-savvy borrowers sign up for open banking (while lenders keep their prior τ in each
market segment), which requires Vi(xb, x′f , τ) ≥ Vi(xf , xb, τ) for both i = h, l. That is, this type of
equilibrium is sustained if both borrowers benefit from open banking with mandatory sign-up; in
later analysis, we will follow Proposition 3 below to rule out such equilibrium.
Only two possible types of equilibria remain: one with σh = 1 and σl ∈ (0, 1) in which the
lenders’ updated prior in the sign-up market segment is τ+ > τ (i.e., signing-up is a signal favoring
high type), and the other with σl = 1 and σh ∈ (0, 1) in which the lenders’ updated prior in the
sign-up market segment is τ+ < τ (i.e., signing-up is a signal favoring low type). Intuitively, the
first type of equilibrium is more sensible since high-type borrowers are more willing to face a fintech
with a higher screening ability. In the following, we explore the possibility that all borrowers suffer
from open banking in this type of equilibrium.
3.2.2 Perverse impact of open banking
To sustain an equilibrium with σh = 1 and σl ∈ (0, 1), we need
Vh(xb, x′f , τ+) ≥ Vh(xf , xb, τ−) (14)
and
Vl(xb, x′f , τ+) = Vl(xf , xb, τ−), (15)
where τ+ > τ > τ−. The latter condition also implicitly requires that the opt-out market segment
be active, i.e.,
τ−r > 1− xf . (16)
In this equilibrium, all low-type borrowers (regardless of their sign-up cost) must be harmed by
open banking since Vl(xf , xb, τ−) < Vl(xf , xb, τ) given τ− < τ . All high-type borrowers will suffer
as well if
Vh(xb, x′f , τ+) < Vh(xf , xb, τ). (17)
The following result shows that such an equilibrium with all borrowers—regardless of their credit
quality or tech-savviness—suffering from open banking exists for a range of primitive parameters.
Proposition 4. There exists a nonzero measure set of primitive parameters (as characterized in
the proof), so that
1. in the unique (nontrivial) equilibrium, (a) all tech-savvy high-type borrowers and a fraction
of tech-savvy low-type borrowers sign up (i.e. σh = 1 and σl ∈ (0, 1)), and (b) all borrowers
become worse off compared to the case before open banking; and
2. in the above equilibrium, compared to the case before open banking, the bank loses while the
fintech gains, industry profit improves, and market efficiency improves as well (if a low-type
borrower generates an efficiency loss whenever she gets a loan).
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For those borrowers who choose not to sign up, they are perceived to have a lower average credit
quality than the whole population (τ− < τ) and so become worse off compared to the case before
open banking. For those who choose to sign up, they are viewed more favorably (τ+ > τ), but if the
screening ability gap becomes sufficiently large, they can still suffer from open banking. Of course
both τ+ and τ− are endogenous in equilibrium, and Proposition 4 ensures that such parameter
configuration exists so that open banking makes all borrowers worse off.
When both market segments are active, both lenders make a positive profit (the bank earns
from the opt-out market segment and the fintech earns from the sign-up market segment), but the
bank earns less than before. When high-type borrowers also suffer from open banking, similarly as
in the case of mandatory sign-up, the screening ability gap ∆′ must be sufficiently larger than ∆.
This explains why the total industry profit must rise in this situation at the expense of borrowers,
which is perhaps contrary to the original intention of open banking regulations.
4 Open Banking: Privacy and Targeted Loans
We so far have focused on sharing data on borrowers’ credit quality. However, the data that modern
financial institutions process are multidimensional, and contain information on other aspects of
customer behavior as well. This section studies “privacy” concerns, i.e., some non-credit information
that borrowers are reluctant to share with their lenders. Such extra information can be particularly
valuable for fintech companies given their more advanced “big data” technology, but a certain type
of “precision marketing” based on such information could potentially hurt customers. Exactly out
of this consideration, and guided by the open-data philosophy mentioned in the introduction, many
regulators around the world mandate consent from customers themselves when sharing their data.
We offer a tractable analysis of equilibrium open banking when non-credit privacy data sharing
is intertwined with credit quality inference. We show that all borrowers could be worse off even if
they control their own data (a similar result as we saw in the previous section); the endogenous
credit quality inference, as the backbone of the lending market competition, implies the sign-up
population is non-monotone in the degree of privacy concerns.
4.1 Consumer “Preferences” for Fintech Loans
Among many potential angles that one could take to explore “privacy,” we focus on the information
about consumer/borrower preferences. This category of information complements well the infor-
mation on credit quality studied in Section 3 which could be viewed as the information on loan
costs.
Taking the baseline model in Section 2, suppose now that each borrower is subject to a privacy
event shock, so that with a probability ξ > 0 the borrower can take out loans only from the fintech
lender. This privacy event, simply called the ξ-event, is independent of the borrower’s credit quality
type. Before open banking, this privacy event is unobservable to both lenders. However, with open
banking, this event will be revealed to the fintech lender perfectly for borrowers who sign up for
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open banking, so fintech lenders will be able to know exactly when borrowers are “locked in” to
fintech loans. Albeit stark, our modeling of ξ-events is motivated by “event-based marketing,” and
captures the idea that open banking enables fintech lenders to perform “precision marketing” by
combining the newly accessible borrower’s banking transaction records with some other existing
information (e.g., the borrower’s social media data).24 Open banking hence helps fintech lenders
invade the borrower’s privacy.
In general, consumer privacy and precision marketing in our setting fall into two broad cat-
egories. The first is when some borrowers strongly prefer fintech loans. For instance, when a
consumer shops on an e-commerce platform, she might have a strong preference for “immediacy”
(i.e., buying a certain product immediately). If she needs to borrow but has no credit cards, in
this case fintech lenders often dominate traditional banks by processing loan applications much
faster.25 With open banking, the transaction records from the borrower’s bank (which may contain
important information, say, on the borrower’s consumption habits), together with the borrower’s
digital footprint, often enable the fintech lender to better identify the event of demand immediacy.
The second category is when borrowers face a restricted set of available lenders in some circum-
stances. For example, a borrower could be ineligible for bank loans sometime (e.g., because she
happens to be close to the bank’s borrowing limit), or she travels abroad and needs an emergency
loan in foreign currency (say for health insurances) unavailable from her bank. Open banking pro-
vides such information to fintech lenders so that they can then target the borrower more precisely.
We assume that these ξ-events are realized “ex post”, after borrowers have made their sign-up
decisions; this way, the belief updating with regard to the borrower’s opt-in/opt-out decision is only
on credit quality, just like in Section 3. Our previous real-world examples are chosen to highlight
the idiosyncratic nature of these privacy events. In practice, customer borrowers often decide once
and for all whether to opt in or opt out of open banking when they start using the fintech services;
a case-by-case decision likely involves a prohibitively high attention cost. Even if one can swiftly
opt out of open banking “without strings attached” as described in the Deloitte Insight survey in
the introduction, borrowers are unlikely to know exactly what data will be useful for the fintech,
without mentioning that it might be too late to opt out as they have consented to sharing their
recent banking history.
Given that the borrowers in the ξ-event can borrow from the fintech only, they are similar to
the “captured” consumers in Varian (1980). But our model offers some new economics due to the
winner’s curse embedded in the credit market competition. For instance, in contrast to the Varian
model, we will show soon that the possibility of being captured does not always hurt a borrower,
24Precision marketing is a broader idea in retail business. Doug Shaddle, Director of Sales for UberMedia, once said
that “the adoption of mobile technology is creating new data streams that can provide retailers with an unprecedented
amount of information about who their shoppers are and how to bring them further into the fold, ... to deliver the
right offer, at the right time, to the right customer.” (See https://bwnews.pr/2FBXeA3.) Of course, broadly speaking,
precision marketing could play a role for our study of credit information in Section 3 if the fintech, due to its superior
technology, can classify borrowers into more categories after open banking and so tailor more personalized offers. It
is an interesting direction for future research.
25See, for instance, Fuster, Plosser, Schnabl, and Vickery (2019) for evidence that fintechs are faster at processing
loans in the context of housing mortgages.
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and also the fintech does not always earn a positive profit even with some captured borrowers.26
4.2 Competition Equilibrium before Open Banking
We first extend the baseline model in Section 2 to include the ξ-event and analyze the credit
market competition before open banking. The resulting equilibrium serves as the benchmark for
later analysis.
4.2.1 The magnitude of ξ
The equilibrium structure crucially depends on the magnitude of ξ, i.e., the probability that a
borrower can borrow from the fintech only. When
ξ ≤ φ (r) , xbτ
1−xf r − (1− xb)
< 1, (18)
the fintech lender (who has a weaker screening ability) still makes a zero profit, and the equilibrium
structure is similar as in Proposition 1 (i.e., the baseline case of ξ = 0). When ξ > φ (r), however,
both lenders earn a positive profit with a different equilibrium structure. In fact, by simply charging
the maximum interest rate r (upon seeing a good signal), the fintech gains from borrowers who
pass both screenings and are in their ξ-events, but loses from serving borrowers who are rejected
by the bank:27
ξ · pHH [µHH (r + 1)− 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸






φ (r) − 1
)
. (19)
When ξ exceeds the critical value in (18), the gain dominates and hence the fintech with a sufficient
measure of captured borrowers earns a positive profit.
4.2.2 Equilibrium characterization before open banking
When (18) holds, the bank always makes an offer upon seeing a good signal, while the zero-profit
fintech makes an offer with probability mξf < 1, where we use the superscript “ξ” to indicate the
model with a possible ξ-event. The two lenders’ indifference conditions are similar to those in the
baseline:
pHH
 (1− ξ)F ξb(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
win if beats bank
+ ξ︸︷︷︸
win for sure
 [µHH (r + 1)− 1]− pLH = πξf = 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
fintech: zero profit
, (20)
26Also, with open banking our model is a variant of Varian (1980) where only one firm can identify its captured
consumers and hence price discriminate accordingly. This scenario, which is quite natural in our context of credit
market competition, is rarely considered in the literature on industrial organization.
27For the purpose of illustration, the borrower in the ξ-event is assumed to be screened by the bank (though never















[µHH (r + 1)− 1]− pHL
}
= πξb > 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
bank: positive profit
. (21)
When (18) does not hold, both lenders will make an offer for sure upon seeing a good signal, and
so we will have mξf = 1 and π
ξ
f > 0 in the above two indifference conditions.
Recall Vi (τ) in (9) and (10); we omit the screening ability variables since they are kept constant
in this section. The following proposition reports the details of the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Before open banking, the equilibrium with possible privacy event can be character-
ized as follows;
1. When ξ < φ (r), the fintech makes a zero profit πξf = 0 while the bank makes a profit π
ξ
b =
(1− ξ) xb−xf1+τ > 0. The fintech adopts the same pricing strategy as in Proposition 1 with





mξb = 1. The borrower surpluses are:
V ξh (τ) = Vh (τ) , (22)
V ξl (τ) = Vl (τ)− ξδ (1− xb) (xf + (1− xf )φ (r)) . (23)
2. When ξ = φ (r), there exists a continuum of equilibria indexed by mξf ∈ [1− φ (r) , 1], which is
the fintech’s loan offer probability to a borrower with a good signal. Everything else is identical
to case (1), except for the low-type surplus which is given in Appendix A.9.
3. When ξ > φ (r), both lenders make positive profits. Upon seeing a good signal both lenders
always make an offer (i.e., mξf = m
ξ










φ(r) · φ (r). The borrower surpluses are
V ξh (τ) = (1− ξ)
2
[
r − (1− xb) (1− xf )
τ
]
< Vh (τ) , (24)
V ξl = δ [(1− ξ) (1− xbxf ) + ξ (1− xf )] . (25)
The third case of a relatively large ξ > φ (r) is similar to the Varian-type model (with asymmetric
sizes of captured consumers across firms). Thanks to its relatively large base of (potentially)
captured borrowers, the fintech—despite its weaker credit screening ability—always extends loan
offers upon seeing a good signal and makes a positive profit. The larger the ξ, the more the captured
borrowers, and the higher interest rates from both lenders in the sense of FOSD.
The first case of a relatively small ξ < φ (r) is more “surprising.” We find that the fintech with
relatively few captured borrowers takes a pricing strategy that is independent of ξ—more precisely,
it is the same as in the baseline ξ = 0. The bank, in contrast, prices more aggressively. Why? As
typical in a setting with a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the bank’s pricing strategy is determined by
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the fintech’s zero-profit condition (20). But the zero-profit condition implies that the fintech must
lose from non-captured borrowers in equilibrium. As a result, the bank bids more aggressively (and
earns less), so much so that high-type borrowers lose nothing from the presence of potential ξ-event;
see Eq. (22). (This result differs from the case of large ξ just discussed above, or more generally,
the Varian-type model.) On the other hand, because the potential ξ-event prevents borrowers from
taking bank loans, this hurts low-type borrowers who only care about the chance of receiving a
loan.28
Finally, in the knife-edge case (2), when ξ = φ (r) there exists a continuum of equilibria indexed
by mξf ∈ [1− φ (r) , 1], the fintech’s probability of making an offer upon seeing a good signal. This
explains why low-type borrowers who care only about loan probabilities are affected by the fintech’s
policy. In this continuum of equilibria, mξf = 1−φ (r) corresponds to case (1) with ξ < φ (r), while
mξf =1 corresponds to case (3) with ξ > φ (r). This continuum of equilibria plays a role when we
analyze the model with voluntary sign-up.
4.3 Equilibrium Open Banking with Targeted Loans
We first solve the mandatory sign-up case to highlight the type-dependent incentives to opt in,
and then characterize the equilibrium when sign-up is voluntary. To highlight the new role of open
banking in this section, we assume that the fintech lender’s screening ability on credit type remains
unchanged (i.e., x′f = xf ) after open banking.29 The fintech gains from open banking by taking
advantage of the borrowers’ data to extend targeted loans in the ξ-event.
4.3.1 Mandatory sign-up
Suppose that borrowers are mandated to sign up for open banking. To borrowers in their ξ-events,
the fintech charges the monopolistic rate r whenever it sees a good signal. For borrowers in their
non–ξ-events, lenders compete as in Proposition 1, leading a zero profit for the fintech. The fintech’s
expected profit hence is:
πξ,OBf = ξ ·
 θr︸︷︷︸
profit from high-type
− (1− θ) (1− xf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss from low-type given H signal
 = ξ · τr − (1− xf )1 + τ > 0. (26)
Superscript “ξ,OB” indicates the ξ-event model under open banking.) For borrower surplus, in the
ξ-event, a high-type borrower is charged r (hence no rent left), while a low-type borrower receives
a loan given a good signal from the fintech (which occurs with probability 1− xf ). Therefore with
28The potential ξ-event hurts the low-type borrower, relative to the baseline model, only in the following scenario.
The borrower receives a good signal from the bank (which occurs with prob. 1− xb) but the fintech does not make
any loan (which occurs with probability xf + (1− xf )φ (r), the fintech either receives a bad signal, or a good signal
but does not lend). This explains ξ (1− xb) (xf + (1− xf )φ (r)) in Eq. (23).
29For this reason, we have ignored the screening ability variables in the borrower surplus function in this section.
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open banking and mandatory sign-up, the type-dependent borrower surpluses are:
V ξ,OBh (τ) = (1− ξ)Vh (τ) , (27)
V ξ,OBl (τ) = (1− ξ)Vl (τ) + δξ (1− xf ) , (28)
where Vi (τ) are in (9) and (10).
By comparing them to Proposition 5, we have the next proposition on the impacts of open
banking (with mandatory sign-up):
Proposition 6. Compared to the regime before open banking,
1. there exists ξ̂ ∈ (φ (r) , 1) such that high-type borrowers suffer from open banking with manda-
tory sign-up if and only if ξ ≤ ξ̂, while low-type borrowers suffer if and only if ξ > φ (r).
Therefore both types of borrower strictly suffer when ξ ∈
(
φ (r) , ξ̂
)
; and
2. open banking with mandatory sign-up helps the fintech but (weakly) harms the bank.
The fintech benefits from open banking, as it now can price discriminate and offer targeted loans
to exploit the borrowers in their ξ-events. The bank strictly suffers when ξ > φ (r), because in
that case after open banking, the fintech will compete more aggressively for non--ξ-event borrowers.
(When ξ ≤ φ (r), the fintech adopts the same pricing strategy before and after open banking, and
that is why open banking has no impact on the bank.)
Open banking has an intriguing type-dependent impact on borrower surplus, which drives our
analysis of the voluntary sign-up equilibrium in the next section. When ξ < φ (r) so that the fintech
lender still earns zero profit before open banking, the high type suffer from open banking which
facilitates the fintech to target their ξ-events. In comparison, the low type benefit since they now
receive an offer for sure in the ξ-event if the signal is good (but before open banking in the same
event, the fintech might not make offers as mξf < 1).
When ξ > φ (r) so that the privacy concern is relatively large, the result concerning the low-
type surplus is reversed. Thanks to a sufficiently large number of captured borrowers, before open
banking the fintech lender makes a strictly positive profit and always offers a loan upon seeing a
good signal. However, after open banking, the fintech can identify captured borrowers perfectly,
and as a result it scales back in non--ξ-events (mξ,OBf < 1 so it randomly drops out without making
offers). Low-type borrowers thus prefer opting out of open banking.
For high-type borrowers, they could gain strictly from open banking when ξ > ξ̂; this is again in
contrast to being harmed by open banking when ξ is small. To see this result, consider the limiting
case of ξ → 1. Before open banking, knowing that the fintech will be the de facto monopolist, both
lenders charge interest rates that converge to r. After open banking, the bank—knowing that the
fintech can identify captured borrowers perfectly—offers an interest rate independent of ξ. This
implies that the high-type benefit from open banking.
Proposition 6 delivers a result that is parallel to Proposition 3 in Section 3 on credit quality data
sharing: It is possible that both types of borrower strictly suffer from open banking with mandatory
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sign-up. Just like in Section 3, this perverse welfare effect can hold even when borrowers voluntarily
choose to share their “privacy” data, as we show now.
4.3.2 Voluntary sign-up
Now we study the case with voluntary sign-up. As in Section 3, let ρ be the measure of non–tech-
savvy borrowers with an infinite sign-up cost, which is independent of both credit quality type as
well as of the privacy event.
Recall that the fraction of the tech-savvy type-i borrowers who sign up for open banking is
denoted by σi ∈ [0, 1], and the updated priors of credit quality in the two market segments are
respectively τ+ for the opt-in market and τ− for the opt-out market as defined in (12). In this
section we further assume that ρ is sufficiently large:
ρτr > 1− xf . (29)
The condition says even if σh = 1 (all high-type tech-savvy borrowers opt in) while σl = 0 (all
low-type tech-savvy borrowers opt out), lenders still serve both segments thanks to a sufficiently
favorable updated opt-out prior τ−, in light of condition (1).
Crucially, lender competition in the opt-out segment resembles that in Proposition 5 before
open banking, but the threshold value for ξ—which is φ (r; τ−)—is endogenous and depends on the
updated opt-out prior τ−. For this reason, we write the dependence of τ− of φ (r; τ−) explicitly;
φ (r; τ−) is decreasing in τ−. The following proposition fully characterizes the unique equilibrium
that arises, when we vary ξ.
Proposition 7. With the potential privacy event and voluntary sign-up for open banking, we have
1. when ξ < φ (r; τ), there exists a unique equilibrium where no borrowers sign up, i.e., σh =
σl = 0;
2. when φ (r; τ) < ξ < φ (r; ρτ), there exists a unique equilibrium where σh > σl > 0, so that
τ− = τ 1−(1−ρ)σh1−(1−ρ)σl satisfies ξ = φ (r; τ−); and
3. when ξ > φ (r; ρτ), there exists a unique equilibrium where only high-type borrowers sign up,
i.e., σh = 1 while σl = 0.
The case of small ξ < φ (r; τ). When ξ is sufficiently small, the unique equilibrium is that
nobody signs up for open banking. This explains why the average credit quality in the opt-out
segment is τ− = τ (i.e., the prior), and the lender competition in the opt-out segment falls into
case (1) of Proposition 5.
The intuition is as follows. As we have pointed out in Proposition 6, fixing the average credit
quality, the low-type is more willing to opt in than the high-type. The high-type suffers from open
banking due to fintech exploitation of the privacy event, while the interest rate–insensitive low-type
on the contrary benefits from a greater chance of receiving a loan. It is in sharp contrast to Lemma
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2 which concerns sharing credit quality data in Section 3. There, the high type naturally prefers
a more precise screening technology (relative to the low type); while here, signing up for open
banking means exposing the high type to exploitation by the fintech charging a monopolistic rate
(something that the low type do not care).
This gives rise to a “stigma” effect—akin to the one in the context of Fed’s discount window
(e.g., Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, and Shrader, 2015)—of associating signing up with low credit
quality. Then the low type would not sign up either because doing so would reveal their credit
quality type. Consequently, the only equilibrium is nobody signing up.
The case of large ξ > φ (r; ρτ). When ξ is sufficiently large, the unique equilibrium is that only
high-type (tech-savvy) borrowers sign up for open banking. This explains the equilibrium updated
opt-out prior τ− = ρτ , and the lender competition in the opt-out segment falls into case (3) of
Proposition 5.
Again the endogenous credit quality inference is crucial, because the equilibrium is driven by
low-type borrowers always preferring to opt out. Eq. (25) in Proposition 5 shows that their opt-out
surplus V ξl is independent of τ−; in fact, V
ξ
l achieves its upper bound because both the fintech (with
a sufficiently large measure of captured borrowers) and the bank always make an offer upon good
signals. Opting in open banking exposes the low type to the risk of the fintech (as the weaker
lender) not to make loans in their non–ξ-events. No low-type tech-savvy borrower will opt in, and
then the equilibrium inference is that whoever signs up must be a high-type borrower. We show
that this favorable credit quality inference is sufficient to convince the high type to always sign up
for open banking in equilibrium, despite the exposure of their privacy events.
The case of intermediate ξ ∈ (φ (r; τ) , φ (r; ρτ)). When ξ falls in the intermediate range, the
unique equilibrium takes the form of the knife-edge case (2) in Proposition 5. There, the equilibrium
sign-up populations of both (tech-savvy) types endogenously ensure that ξ = φ (r; τ−), and we pin
down the fintech’s loan offering probability mξf from the two borrower’s indifference conditions.
4.4 Impact of Open Banking and Voluntary Sign-up
Our discussion is based on the following proposition. We first define the sign-up population to be
p (ξ) ≡ (1− ρ) [θσh (ξ) + (1− θ)σl (ξ)] . (30)
Proposition 8. The open banking sign-up population p (ξ) is single peaked at ξ̃ ∈ (φ (r; τ) , φ (r; ρτ)).
For all ξ ∈
[
φ (r; τ) , ξ̃
]
, relative to the case before open banking, all borrowers are strictly worse
off; the fintech gains while the bank loses; and the financial industry gains under conditions given
in the proof.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Open Banking Sign-up Population and Borrower Surplus
Panel A plots the open banking sign-up population p (ξ) as a function of ξ (left scale); the updated opt-in
and opt-out priors τ+ and τ− (right scale). The updated prior τ+ increases with ξ and diverges to ∞ as
ξ → φ (r; ρτ); therefore we cap it at 10. Panel B plots borrower surpluses as a function of ξ; the solid blue
lines with crosses (dots) are surplus for the (non–) tech-savvy high-type borrowers, while solid red lines
(squares) are surplus for the (non–) tech-savvy low-type borrowers. In the figure, φ (r; τ) = 0.18 and
ξ̃ = 0.24. Parameter values are r = 1, xb = 0.8, xf = 0.5, δ = 0.5, ρ = 0.4, and θ = 0.7.
4.4.1 Sign-up population and privacy concerns
Panel A in Figure 2 illustrates the total sign-up population and the updated priors in equilibrium,
as a function of ξ. When ξ increases, initially nobody signs up, p (ξ) = 0, with the updated opt-out
prior τ− staying at the prior τ . Both types of tech-savvy borrowers start to sign up once ξ exceeds
φ (r; τ), which takes a value of 0.18 in our numerical example. The updated opt-out prior τ− goes
down afterwards, while the updated opt-in prior τ+ in the opt-in segment always sits above the
prior τ . The total sign-up population as shown peaks at ξ̃ = 0.24 then goes down afterward; this
is because σh = 1 while σl decreases for ξ > ξ̃, explaining the pattern of updated priors in both
segments. When ξ > φ (r; ρτ) = 0.48, as shown in Panel A the sign-up population p (ξ) remains at
(1− ρ) θ > 0, which is the measure of tech-savvy high-type borrowers.
Our analysis hence generates a surprising comparative static result on the non-monotonic rela-
tion between the equilibrium sign-up population p (ξ) and ξ. A casual thinking might suggest that
p (ξ) decreases with ξ, as ξ captures the borrowers’ privacy concern against data sharing. We show
that this casual thinking captures some economics, but only partially. In the scenario of small ξ,
open banking allows fintech lenders to target high-type borrowers who are concerned about un-
fair pricing, and in fact this stigma effect goes a long way to prevent everybody from signing up
for open banking, as discussed after Proposition 7. However, when the magnitude of the privacy
concern ξ is large, the opt-out incentive of low-type borrowers dominates the equilibrium credit
quality inference, and eventually all tech-savvy high-type borrowers sign up for open banking in
equilibrium.
Our paper hence sheds some light on the economics behind the slow adoption of the open
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banking over time. Since the creation of the Open Banking Implementation Entity (OBIE) by the
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in the UK in 2016, the industry has witnessed little
enthusiasm from consumers.30 This lukewarm reception is often attributed to potential security-
related privacy concerns caused by data sharing. Our analysis on the interaction between privacy
and credit quality calls for a more careful examination of this conventional wisdom.
Taking a slightly different interpretation, our model also suggests that the adoption of open
banking might grow as the business models of the fintech lenders under consideration improves.
Note, the parameter ξ measures the fraction of captured borrowers that can be potentially identified
and targeted by fintech lenders. Therefore, another useful way to think about the magnitude of
ξ as the proxy for the development of fintech businesses. The case of small ξ corresponds to
an underdeveloped “challenger” fintech lender whose business model is in its relative early stage,
lacking a clearly defined target market. In these small-ξ markets, nobody signs up for open banking
in equilibrium. Over time, our model predicts the sign-up population will grow, once fintech lenders
have established their niche markets with more and more captured customers—e.g., young Ivy
League graduates who live in major metropolitan cities–and eventually become profitable after
launching certain successful differentiated products.
4.4.2 Welfare: the perverse effect of open banking
Proposition 8 shows that open banking could make all borrowers worse off even though they control
their own data, and at the same time lead to a higher industry profit. This result follows irrespective
of whether the data sharing concerns credit quality information as in Section 3, or some privacy
information that facilitates making exploitative loans as studied here.
To understand the result regarding borrower surpluses,31 the perverse effect of open banking
emerges in the shaded green area as illustrated in Panel B in Figure 2. Consider ξ′ = φ (r; τ)+ε; we
already know from Proposition 6 that both types of borrowers suffer when sign-up is mandatory.
The intuition for why the low type get worse off due to open banking is similar to Proposition 6 and
quite straightforward. Before open banking, the fintech with a sufficiently large number of captured
borrowers lends aggressively (mξf = 1) upon seeing a good signal, benefiting the low type. With
open banking and voluntary sign-ups, lender competition in the opt-out segment follows case (2)
in Proposition 5; there, some endogenous mξf < 1 emerges to ensure the indifference condition of
borrowers regarding their sign-up decisions. This hurts the low-type borrowers, whose equilibrium
value is the same regardless of whether they are tech savvy or not, opt-in or opt-out (Panel B in
Figure 2).
Now we turn to high-type borrowers. For the tech-savvy high-type borrowers who choose to
30For instance, see Warwick-Ching (2019), among others. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which has forced
consumers and financial institutions alike to recognize the essential nature of digital interactions, offers a great
boost to the adoption of open banking. According to OBIE, over 2 million UK bank customers have connected
their accounts to trusted third parties by the end of September 2020, up from 1 million in January 2020. See
https://bit.ly/3kTvbvg.
31The intuition of the lender profit result is similar to the one given right after Proposition 6.
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sign up, they suffer from the fintech’s exploitative targeted loans facilitated by open banking, as
shown in Proposition 6 for ξ′ = φ (r; τ) + ε < ξ̃. Clearly, those who choose to opt out must be
worse off as well thanks to the indifference equilibrium condition between opt-in and opt-out, and
the mechanism is the endogenous credit quality inference. To see this, the updated opt-out prior,
i.e., τ− (ξ′) that solves ξ′ = φ (r; τ− (ξ′)), must be below the prior τ (as shown in Panel A in Figure
8); this is because for the fintech to be break-even, we must have a lower updated prior for credit
quality τ− to compensate for a larger measure of captured borrowers. But a lower τ− implies that
high-type borrowers in the opt-out segment receive worse treatment from lenders, even if they
choose not to sign up for open banking.
5 Conclusion
As the volume of data created by the digital world continues to grow, customer data has evolved
into a defining force in every business of banking including small business credit, consumption
loans, and retail services. Open banking regulation that requires banks to share their existing
customers’ data with third parties—notably, fintech lenders—at customers’ requests can be viewed
as an integral part of the broader “open economy” initiative, in which the data should be open to
outside third parties at the consent of customers who generate them.
We offer the first theoretical study on the consequence of letting borrowers control their own
data in an otherwise classic credit market competition between an incumbent traditional bank and
a challenger fintech lender. Two kinds of data sharing by borrowers are explored: one concerns
their creditworthiness (i.e., information on lending cost), and the other their choice “privacy” (i.e.,
information on customer preferences).
Although our results generally support the premise that open banking favors challenger fintechs,
we highlight that the voluntary nature of data sharing is not sufficient to protect borrowers’ welfare.
In both scenarios, we show the general existence of scenarios in which all borrowers are strictly worse
off (while the whole financial industry becomes more profitable), even for those who opt out of open
banking. This perverse effect is largely driven by the credit quality inference from borrower’s “sign-
up” decisions, which is rooted in adverse selection as the backbone of credit market competition.
Broadly, this effect is consistent with the information externality caused by consumer decisions,
which poses a long-standing challenge to regulations on consumer protection in modern financial
industry.
There are a few other important issues on open banking that we leave for future research. First,
traditional banks operate not only in the lending market but also in the deposit and payment service
market. Open banking affects their competition with fintech challengers in the latter market as
well, leading to another potential perverse effect on consumers. For instance, as the transaction
account service provides the most valuable data for traditional banks, data sharing required by
open banking may dampen their incentives to compete in that market. Second, from a long-term
perspective, should successful fintech giants also be required to share data back with traditional
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banks? Third, we take open banking regulation as given; but is it better than the market mechanism
where traditional banks act as data brokers and sell their data (upon customer consent) to fintechs?
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Table 1: Notation Summary
Notation Definition and Meaning Characterization
θ Probability of high-type
τ Likelihood ratio of high-type τ = θ1−θ
ρ Proportion of non–tech-savvy borrowers
µi, i ∈ {h, l} Probability that a high/low-type repays µh = 1
δi, i ∈ {h, l} Borrower’s private benefit of receiving a loan δh = 0, δl = δ > 0
Vi(xw, xs, τ) Borrower i’s surplus
j ∈ {b, f, s, w} Lender: traditional bank, or f intech; strong, or weak
Sj ∈ {H,L} Signal of lender j, is H or L
xj Screening ability of lender j in “bad news” structure P(Sj = L|l) = xj
pHH , pHL, pLH , pLL Probabilities of lender signals
µHH , µHL, µLH , µLL Probabilities of repayment for borrowers with given signals
r Upper bound of net interest rate (exogenous)
r Lower bound of net interest rate
mj Probability that lender j grants a loan given Sj = H
rj Net interest rate offered by lender j
Fj(r);F j(r) CDF of rj ; survival function of Fj(r) F j(r) = 1− Fj(r)
λj The mass point of Fj (r) at r λj = lim
r↑r
F j (r)
πj Lender j’s profit
φ(r) Eq (6)
∆ Gap of screening ability ∆ = xs − xw
x′f Screening ability of fintech after open banking in Section 3
σi, i ∈ {h, l} Proportion of type i tech-savvy borrowers who opt in
τ+, τ− Updated prior of borrowers who opt in (+), and who opt out (-)
ξ Probability of privacy event
p(ξ) Population of opt-in borrowers in Section 4
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose first that πs, πw > 0 in equilibrium. Then both lenders make an offer for sure upon
seeing a good signal (i.e. ms = mw = 1). From the two lenders’ indifference conditions, we can
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see that as r ↑ r, at least one of F s(r) and Fw(r) will be zero since it is impossible that both
distributions have a mass point at r = r. Thus, at least one of the lenders will make a negative
profit, which is a contradiction.
Suppose then πw ≥ πs = 0. Then at r = r, we must have Fw(r) = F s(r) = 1, and so we need
pLH ≤ pHL to make both indifference conditions hold. But as we pointed out before this cannot
be true given xs > xw. Therefore, the only remaining possibility is that πs > πw = 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We have known the strong lender’s distribution is F s(r) = φ(r). From F s(r) = 1, we solve
r = (1− xw)/τ , which is less than r given condition (1). The size of Fs’s mass point is λs = φ(r),
which is less than 1 given condition (1). Letting r = r in (3) yields πs = pLH−pHL = (1−θ)∆ = ∆1+τ ,
and letting r = r in (3) yields 1−mw = φ(r). Finally, Fw(r) is solved from (3).
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. (i) Given πs = ∆1+τ ,the result concerning profit is obvious.
(ii) For any given r ∈ [r, r], it is easy to see that φ(r) defined in (6) increases in xs, decreases
in xw, and decreases in τ . So the claims follow immediately on the strong lender’s interest rate
distribution and the weak lender’s probability of making an offer upon seeing a good signal. To see
the result concerning the weak lender’s interest rate distribution, notice that the derivative of
Fw(r) =
xs(1− xw)
τr − (1− xw)
r − r
r − (1−xs)(1−xw)τ
with respect to xs is proportional to
τr − (1− xw) ≥ 0,
where the inequality is because r = (1− xw)/τ . It is easy to see that Fw(r) decreases in both xw
(as the numerator decreases in xw and the denominator increases in xw) and τ (as the denominator
increases in τ).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Result (i) is immediate from Corollary 1. A higher τ induces both lenders to offer lower
interest rates (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) and also induces the weak lender to
make offers more likely upon seeing a good signal. This benefits both types of borrowers.
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The result concerning the impact of xs in (ii) is also immediate from Corollary 1. A higher xs
induces both lenders to charge higher interest rates and also induces the weak lender to make offers
less likely upon seeing a good signal. This harms both types of borrowers.
When xw increases, we know from Corollary 1 that interest rates go up and the weak lender
offers loans more likely upon seeing a good signal, and so the high-type must become better off. But
now the weak lender receives a high signal less likely from a low-type borrower, and this negatively
impacts the low-type borrowers. A straightforward calculation of the derivative of Vl with respect
to xw yields the cut-off result.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. The result concerning the impact of ∆ is immediately from Proposition 2 since for a fixed
xw increasing ∆ is the same as increasing xs.
The result concerning the impact of the base screening ability xw is less straightforward. For
notational simplicity, in the proof let x = xw represent the base screening ability. Notice that







φ(r) = x+ ∆τ
1−xr − 1 + x+ ∆
.
Its derivative with respect to x equals
[r̄τ − (1− x)] [∆ (1− x+ r̄τ) + 2r̄τx]
τ
[
∆ (1− x)− (1− x)2 + r̄τ
]2 > 0,
where the inequality is from 0 < x < 1 and Assumption 1 which implies r̄τ − (1− x) > 0.
For the low-type borrowers,
1
δ
Vl(x,∆, τ) = 1− (x+ ∆) [x+ (1− x)φ(r)] ,
Its derivative with respect to x equals
− [r̄τ − (1− x)] [∆ (1− x+ r̄τ) + 2r̄τx][
∆ (1− x)− (1− x)2 + r̄τ
]2 < 0.
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A.7 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let us define the φ function and the lower bound of the interest rate distribution in each
market segment as follows:









When low-type borrowers are indifferent between signing up or not, from Vl defined in (10) we
know
x′f [xb + (1− xb)φ+ (r)] = xb [xf + (1− xf )φ− (r)] .
Given x′f > xb > xf and φ+ (r̄) , φ− (r̄) ≤ 1, we deduce that
xb + (1− xb)φ+ (r) < xf + (1− xf )φ− (r) ≤ xb + (1− xb)φ− (r) ,
and so
φ− (r) > φ+ (r) . (31)

















where the second inequality used x′f > xb and rr+ > 1. Hence,
r− > r+. (32)







− δ = (r − r+) (1− φ+ (r)) > Vh (xf , xb, τ−)− δ = (r − r−) (1− φ− (r)) ,
i.e. high-type borrowers with a zero sign-up cost must strictly prefer to sign up.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. (i) Here we prove that there is a non-empty set of primitive parameters such that (14)-
(17) hold. (We relegate to the online appendix the detailed characterization of the range of the
parameters and the condition for uniqueness.)
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First, by continuity we can focus on the edge case with xb = xf . (Our argument below continues
to work when xb and xf are sufficiently close to each other.)
Second, given Vh decreases in the strong lender’s screening ability and x′f > xb, (17) must hold
if τ+ is sufficiently close to τ . This can be achieved if we let σl be sufficiently close to 1.
Third, we choose τ− < τ so that the equality of (16) holds. (This is feasible given (1). By
continuity the argument also works for a slightly bigger τ−, in which case (16) holds.) The advantage
of choosing τ− in this way is that we have Vh(xf , xb, τ−)− δ = 0 in the opt-out market segment so
that (14) must hold. When σh = 1, we have




Then for any τ− < τ and σl ∈ (0, 1), we must be able to find a ρ ∈ (0, 1) which solves the above
equation.
Finally, we need to ensure that (15) holds for some parameters. The remaining parameter we
can choose is x′f . When the equality of (16) holds, one can check that Vl(xf , xb, τ−)/δ = 1 − xb.
Then (15) requires
x′f
xb + (1− xb) x′frτ+




Notice that when τ+ = τ , given (1), there exists ε > 0 such that the above equation has a solution
x′f ∈ (xb + ε, 1).32 The same argument works if τ+ is sufficiently close to τ . That is, for a τ+ ≈ τ
(or σl ≈ 1) chosen in the second step, the above equation has a solution x′f bounded away from xb
so that (15) holds.
(ii) Before open banking, the bank earns π0b = ∆1+τ and the fintech earns π
0
f = 0. After open
banking, let n+ and n− be the measure of consumers who sign up and who do not, respectively.
(They satisfy n+ + n− = 1.) Notice that we must have n+ (1− θ+) + n− (1− θ−) = 1 − θ, where




+ n−1 + τ−
= 11 + τ . (33)
In the sign-up market segment, the two lenders’ profits are respectively







Proof. This is because when x′f = 1, the left-hand side must be strictly greater than xb; when x′f = xb + ε, the
left-hand side must be strictly less than xb + ε for some ε > 0.
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, π−f = 0.
It is clear that the fintech earns a higher profit than before, while the bank’s profit drops as
π0b =
∆








where the inequality used (33).











1 + τ .
Given (33), this is the case if ∆′ > ∆, which must be true in our equilibrium where the high-type
borrowers who sign up suffer from open banking. (This is because from Corollary 2, we know that
Vh increases in the base screening ability and the average credit quality but decreases in the ability
gap. In the sign-up market segment, the base ability improves from xf to xb and the average credit
quality improves from τ and τ+, and so the high-type borrowers become worse off only if ∆′ > ∆.)
The result concerning market efficiency follows from the same argument as in the case of com-
pulsory sign-up.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Before open banking, fintech cannot condition its strategy on the ξ-event. Similar results as Lemma




, and at most
one of them can have a mass point at the top r = r.
The case of ξ < φ (r):
Proof. From the discussion of ξ’s critical value (see Equation 19), if ξ < φ (r), fintech’s profit in the
ξ-event is dominated by the winner’s curse in the non--ξ-event when evaluated at r = r. Hence, by
the same argument in Proposition 1, one lender makes zero profit and randomly drops out upon
seeing a good signal, and the other lender earns a positive profit, always makes an offer and has a
mass point at r = r, such that both lenders to be willing to offer at r = r. Similar to the argument
in Lemma 1, if πξf > π
ξ




b , which further implies pLH < pHL, contradiction.
Therefore, following Proposition 1, there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium with fintech
randomly dropping out mξf < 1 and traditional bank’s mass point λ
ξ
b at the top.























The traditional bank’s indifference condition (21) is the same as in the baseline, so fintech’s strategy
must be the same as in the baseline: upon seeing a good signal, it makes an offer with probability








φ (r)− φ (r)
1− φ (r) .
We now derive the borrower surplus. As the mixed-strategy equilibrium here only differs from






1−ξ ), it is convenient to illustrate the borrower
surplus as the benchmark surplus Vi plus a wedge due to the ξ-event. The high-type borrowers
care about the expected interest rate, so
V ξh (τ) =
(






















where the second term in the curly bracket corresponds to the ξ-event in which there is only one




h (τ) = Vh (τ) . Low-type borrowers only care about the
probability of receiving a loan, so
V ξl (τ) = (1− ξ)Vl (xf , xb, τ) + ξ (1− xf ) (1− φ (r)) δ.
In the 1− ξ event, the equilibrium differs from baseline equilibrium only in F ξb (r), and thus a low
type who does not care about pricing has the same surplus Vl (xf , xb, τ) as in baseline; in the ξ-
event, the fintech is the only lender, and the borrower only receives the loan when (wrongly) tested
with H (probability 1− xf ) and the fintech does make the offer (probability mξf = 1− φ (r)).
The case of ξ = φ (r):
Proof. When ξ = φ (r), from lenders’ indifference conditions (20) and (21), we know lender profits
πξb , π
ξ
f , lowest interest rate rξ, and bank pricing distribution F
ξ
b(r) are the same form as when
ξ < φ (r). At r = r, the size of bank’s mass point shrinks to λξb = 0 exactly, and it follows that the
fintech may also yield borrowers to the traditional bank (to make the latter participate) by a mass
point at r, in addition to randomly dropping out upon H as in the case of ξ < φ (r). Hence, there
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f = φ (r).












f (r) = φ (r)
as in ξ < φ (r)). This completes the characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium.
The choice of mξf affects the probability of receiving the loan and hence low-type’s surplus,
while high type still earns V ξh (τ) = Vh (τ). Specifically,









The case of ξ > φ (r):
Proof. Similar to Varian (1980), the unique equilibrium is a mixed-strategy one on common support[
rξ, r
]
; rξ will be shown to be different from other cases shortly. First, we argue that both lenders
have positive profits and always make an offer upon seeing a good signal, so mξj = 1 for j ∈ {b, f}.
To see this, one feasible strategy for the fintech is to always offer r = r upon seeing a good signal,
and the associated profit is no less than
pHHξ [µHH (r + 1)− 1]− pLH = (1− θ)xb (1− xf )




To make the traditional bank willing to offer at r = r, fintech has a mass point λξf at r and the
traditional bank is open at r. The traditional bank must also make positive profit πξb > 0 due to
better screening ability.33





: πξf = pHH
[
ξ + (1− ξ)F ξb (r)
]
[µHH (r + 1)− 1]− pLH , (34)
Evaluating (34) at r = r yields the fintech’s profit
πξf = ξ ·
τr − (1− xf )
1 + τ − (1− ξ) ·
xb (1− xf )
1 + τ , (35)
which allows us to solve for rξ (as the fintech is earning πξf at rξ as well):
rξ = ξr + (1− ξ) (1− xb)(1− xf )
τ
. (36)
Note that the lower bound here is higher than that in the baseline, rξ > r, because at lower bound
interest rate the fintech serves all borrowers tested with Sf = H in both cases but here πξf > 0.
33To see this, consider when a lender posts r = rξ and gets to serve all borrowers tested with HH. Then adjusting
for market size, the traditional bank suffers from less serious winner’s curse.
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φ (r)− φ (r)
φ (r) .









f (r) [µHH (r + 1)− 1]− pHL
}
, (37)
Using this condition at r = rξ, we have bank profit


















with the mass point λf = ξ. Note that F
ξ
f (r) strictly increases in ξ, so with a larger ξ the fintech
offers loans at higher interest rates in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
As for borrower surplus, a high-type borrower always receives a loan and cares about the
expected interest rate,




















a low-type borrower receives a loan when in the ξ-event she is tested H with the fintech, or when
otherwise she is tested H with at least one of the lenders,
V ξl (τ) = δ [ξ (1− xf ) + (1− ξ) (1− xbxf )] .
In addition, we show that high types are worse off due to the very likely privacy event,
i.e. V ξh (τ) < Vh (τ) when ξ > φ (r). Recall that the expected interest rate in the baseline is
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mfE [min {rb, rf}] + (1−mf )E [rb] = r +
∫ r
r φ










































Note that there is a discontinuous downward jump in V ξh (τ) at the threshold ξ = φ (r): for a
smaller ξ the ξ-event does not affect borrower surplus but a larger ξ makes her worse off.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. 1. When ξ ≤ φ (r), the fintech earns a zero profit before open banking but a positive profit
after, and the bank makes the same profit in either case. When ξ > φ (r), from (26) and (35) it is
immediate to see that the fintech benefits from open banking; while the bank suffers as












> πξ,OBb = (1− ξ) {pHH [µHH (r + 1)− 1]− pHL} ,
where rξ > r as shown in Proposition 5.
2. When ξ ≤ φ (r), it is straightforward to check that V ξ,OBh (τ) < V
ξ
h (τ) in (22) and
V ξ,OBl (τ) > V
ξ
l (τ) from fintech’s offering probability in the ξ-event. When ξ > φ (r), the low
type suffer from open banking because by comparing (25) and (28), we have
V ξl = δ (1− ξ) (1− xbxf ) + δξ (1− xf ) > (1− ξ)Vl (τ) + δξ (1− xf ) = V
ξ,OB
l (τ) , (38)
where the inequality holds as δ (1− xbxf ) is greater thanVl (τ) in (10). (The equality will hold if
τ →∞.)34 The high type suffer from open banking if
V ξh (τ) = (1− ξ)
2
[
r − (1− xb) (1− xf )
τ
]
> (1− ξ)Vh(τ) = V ξ,OBl (τ) ,
which is equivalent to
(1− ξ) (r − r + xbr) > Vh(τ) = (r − r) (1− φ (r)) .
34In the knife edge case open banking may hurt or benefit low-type depending on the equilibriummξf ∈ [1− φ (r) , 1] .
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This holds if and only if ξ is below some threshold ξ̂ ∈ (φ (r) , 1).
3. This result directly follows from result 2).
A.11 Proof of Proposition 7




i (τ−) the i-type’s incentive
to sign up. The sign-up equilibrium is a collection of tech-savvy borrowers’ sign-up decisions
{σi}, and beliefs about the average credit quality in each market segment {τ−, τ+}, such that a)
{τ−, τ+}are determined by the Bayes’ rule and characterized in (12); b) {σi}satisfy borrowers’
incentive compatibility conditions that are similar to (13) with surplus V ξi (τ−) for not signing















respectively for borrowers who opted in and who opted out.
Contrary to Subsection 4.3.1, now the threshold of ξ which decides the lender strategy in the opt-
out segment is endogenous and depends on τ− (for borrowers who signed up, ξ does not affect the
structure of lender competition). We first characterize the case with ξ < φ (r; τ) and the case with
ξ > φ (r; ρτ), where lender strategies in the opt-out segment respectively follow Case 1 and Case 3
in Proposition 5; then we characterize the equilibrium in the case with φ (r; τ) ≤ ξ ≤ φ (r; ρτ).
Small ξ Case: ξ < φ (r; τ)
Proof. First we show that when τ− ≤ τ , low-type has a higher willingness to sign up. The ξ
threshold of lender strategy in the opt-out pool is φ (r; τ−). Note that Condition 29 ensures rτ− ≥
1 − xf . When τ− ≤ τ , we have φ (r; τ−) ≥ φ (r; τ) > ξ, so for the opting out borrowers, lender
strategy and borrower surplus follow Case 1 in Proposition 5. Then for high-type to be willing to
sign up,
V ξh (τ−) = Vh (τ−)
willing to sign up
≤ (1− ξ)Vh(τ+) = V ξ,OBh (τ+) .
HenceVh (τ−) < Vh(τ+) and τ− < τ+. With the better inference and the effects of ξ-event on low
type shown in (23) and (28), low-type must strictly prefer to sign up:
V ξl (τ−) < Vl (τ−) < Vl (τ+) < V
ξ,OB
l (τ+).
This result rules out equilibrium where a higher proportion of high-type borrowers sign up, σh ≥
σl > 0, under which τ− ≤ τ follows and low-type has higher willingness to sign up. If 1 > σh > 0,
then low-type must strictly prefer signing up and σl = 1 > σh. If σh = 1, then σl = 1, but
τ− = τ+ = τ contradicts with high type’s sign up incentive.
We now rule out that a larger proportion of low-type signing up in equilibrium, i.e., σl > σh > 0
and hence τ− > τ > τ+. In this case, the endogenous ξ threshold φ (r; τ−) < φ (r; τ) and lender
competition in the opt-out pool may not always follow one case in Proposition 5. If ξ < φ (r; τ−),
the competition follows Case 1 in Proposition 5, but τ− > τ > τ+ violates high-type’s sign up
incentive. If ξ = φ (r; τ−) we show later that it must be σl < σh; and if φ (r; τ−) < ξ < φ (r; τ), we
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show later that σh = 1, σl = 0. The last two cases have σl < σh hence contradict with the premise
that “larger proportion of low-type signing up in equilibrium.”
Hence the only possible equilibria is σh = σl = 0 and τ− = τ+ = τ , under which lender strategy
is Case 1 in Proposition 5. Introduce τ̂ as the threshold τ+ for high-type to be indifferent to sign
up, so
Vh (τ) = (1− ξ)Vh(τ̂).
If the off-equilibrium belief for anyone who signs up satisfy τ+ < τ̂ , high-type borrower does not
sign up, and low-type also does not want to sign up to be revealed.
Therefore, in the unique equilibrium nobody signs up and the off-equilibrium belief satisfies
τ+ < τ̂ .
Large ξ Case: ξ > φ (r; ρτ)
Proof. Note that τ− = ρτ is the lower bound of τ−, and is reached when all tech savvy high-type
sign up,σh = 1, but none of the low-type signs up, σl = 0. Hence, for any possible equilibrium
belief τ−, we have ξ > φ (r; ρτ) ≥ φ (r; τ−): lender competition for borrowers who did not sign up
always follows Case 3 in Proposition 5.
Eq. (38) says it is a dominant strategy for the l-type borrower not to sign up, σl = 0. Then
if anyone were to sign up, it must be a high-type borrower and τ+ = ∞. As a result, in the non–
ξ-event, lenders compete for the opt-in segment a la Bertrand: lenders always charge r = rξ,OB =
1−xf
τ+
= 0. Then the expected interest rate after open banking is ξr, and is smaller than that before





























(2− ξ) ξr + (1− ξ)2 (1− xb) (1− xf )
τ−
]
= −ξ (1− ξ) r − (1− ξ)2 (1− xb) (1− xf )
τ−
< 0.
Therefore in the unique sign-up equilibrium, σh = 1 and σl = 0.
Intermediate ξ Case: φ (r; τ) < ξ < φ (r; ρτ)
Proof. Step 1. We argue that in equilibrium ξ = φ (r; τ−) always holds so that the lender com-
petition in the opt-out segment switches structures. Otherwise, if in equilibrium ξ < φ (r; τ−),
nobody signs up and τ− = τ , which contradicts with φ (r; τ) ≤ ξ; if ξ > φ (r; τ−), only tech-savvy
high-type borrowers opt in and τ− = ρτ which contradicts with ξ ≤ φ− (r; τ− = ρτ). Hence, when
φ (r; τ) ≤ ξ ≤ φ (r; ρτ), in equilibrium ξ is on the cutoff ξ = φ (r; τ−).
Step 2. We argue that in equilibrium it must be that σl ∈ (0, 1) and σh > 0. Suppose not; we
prove by contradiction.
1. Say σl = 0. If σh = 0, then τ− = τ+ = τ and ξ > φ (r; τ−), lenders compete for the opt-out
segment following Case 3 in Proposition 5, which leads to σh = 1, σl = 0, contradiction. If
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σh > 0, then τ+ = +∞ and for a borrower who signs up lenders always make an offer upon
H; it follows that low-type borrowers must be at least indifferent to sign up, contradiction.
2. Hence, σl > 0 in equilibrium, which implies that some high-type borrowers must sign up (i.e.,
σh > 0); otherwise the low-type fully reveal themselves in the opt-in segment and lenders do
not participate.
3. We now rule out the case of σl = 1, under which τ− ≥ τ and ξ > φ (r; τ) ≥ φ (r; τ−). Lender
competition in the opt-out segment leads to sign-up strategies σh = 1, σl = 0, contradiction.










The fintech’s offering probability mξ,OBf− in the opt-out segment and beliefs τ+, τ− make low-type
borrowers indifferent (i.e., 1 > σl > 0) and high-types either indifferent or strictly prefer to sign up
(i.e., σh > 0). Specifically, borrower surplus for not signing up are
V ξ,OBh,− (τ−) = Vh (τ−) ,









prob at least one loan
+ξ (1− xf )mξ,OBf−︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob fintech loan
,
where mξ,OBf− versus mass point at r = r only influences the probability of receiving a loan but
does not affect the expected interest rate. For borrowers who signed up, surplus V ξ,OBi,+ (τ+) are the
same as (27) and (28) except for adjusted belief τ+.
For the high-type, there are two subcases to consider.
1. Suppose that the high-type are indifferent to sign up; then τ+ and mξ,OBf− ≥ 1−φ (r; τ−) make
both type of borrowers indifferent:35 V ξ,OBi,− (τ−) = V
ξ,OB
i,+ (τ+) , i = h, l. Hence, we have36
φ+ (r) =
2xb + (1 + ξ) (1− xb)−
√
[2xb + (1 + ξ) (1− xb)]2 − 4ξ (xb + (1− xb) ξ)
2 (xb + (1− xb) ξ)
, (41)
35Equilibrium mξ,OBf− is well defined and unique. The low-type’s indifference condition is equivalent to




(ξ + (1− ξ)xb)− (1− ξ)xbφ+ (r)
]
,
where φ+ (r) ≡ φ (r; τ+) .mξ,OBf− ≥ 1 − φ (r; τ−) is satisfied because when m
ξ,OB
f− = 1 − φ (r; τ−) low type strictly
prefers to sign up as φ− (r) (ξ + (1− ξ)xb) > (1− ξ)xb φ+ (r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<φ−=ξ
, and when mξ,OBf− = 1, low type strictly prefers to opt
out. Note that ∆V ξ,OBl is monotone in m
ξ,OB
f− , so m
ξ,OB
f− is unique.
36It follows that φ+ (r) satisfies the following quadratic equation,
(xb + (1− xb) ξ)φ2+ − [2xb + (1 + ξ) (1− xb)]φ+ + ξ = 0. (40)
It has two positive roots, and only the smaller root is smaller than 1. Later we study τ+; since τ+ and φ+are negatively





ξ + (1− ξ)xb
. (42)
From belief updating rules τ+ = τ σhσl and τ− = τ
ρ+(1−ρ)(1−σh)

















where τ− is determined in (39) and τ+ is determined by (41) and (6). Note that ∂∂τ−φ (r; τ−) <
0 implies that τ− < τ < τ+ for ξ > φ (r; τ) and φ (r; τ−) = ξ. As a result, σh > σl from belief
updating rule τ+ = τ σhσl . This observation completes the earlier proof of a unique sign-up
equilibrium under “ Small ξ Case” (i.e., ξ < φ (r; τ)) where we rule out τ+ > τ > τ− with
σl > σh.
2. Now suppose that σh = 1. From belief updating we have
σl =
1− ττ− ρ




and mξ,OBf− is determined in (42). Note that this corner equilibrium must arise when ξ →
φ (r; ρτ); in this situation, we have τ− → ρτ and τ+ → +∞, under which
V ξ,OBh,+ (τ+)→ (1− ξ) r > V
ξ,OB
h,− (τ−) = (1− φ (r; τ−))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−ξ
(r − r−) ,
and the high-type borrowers strictly prefer to sign up. At the same time, σl → 0 while
low-type borrowers stay indifferent whether or not to sign up.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. First we argue that there exists a ξ̃ ∈ (φ (r; τ) , φ (r; ρτ)) such that 0 ≤ σh < 1 when
φ (r; τ) ≤ ξ < ξ̃ and σh = 1 when ξ̃ ≤ ξ ≤ φ (r; ρτ). To see this, we already argued in Appendix
A.11 that σh = 1, 0 < σl < 1 must arise when ξ is sufficiently close to φ (r; ρτ). When ξ = φ (r; τ),
we have τ− = τ and σh = σl = 0. Hence by continuity of σh, σl in ξ, there exists such a ξ̃ below
which high-type is indifferent to sign up and above which high-type strictly prefers to sign up.
Recall that θ+, θ− are respectively the average quality of opt-in and opt-out borrowers. Natu-
rally p (ξ) θ+ + (1− p (ξ)) θ− = θ, and thus
p (ξ) = θ − θ−
θ+ − θ−
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decreases in both θ+ and θ−. When φ (r; τ) ≤ ξ < ξ̃, high-type is indifferent to sign up, so τ+
must decrease with ξ to balance the deterioration of τ−. Hence, p (ξ) increases in ξ in this case.




1−ρ , so p (ξ) ≡ (1− ρ) [θ + (1− θ)σl]
decreases in ξ.
Then we discuss the welfare implications for ξ ∈
[
φ (r; τ) , ξ̃
]
. First, since tech savvy borrowers of
both credit type are indifferent to sign up and have the same surplus as non--tech-savvy borrowers.
Hence, it suffices to discuss how open banking affects the non--tech-savvy borrowers. We argue
that high-type loses,















(1− xb) (1− xf )xb






Note that before open banking lenders always make loans upon H signal when ξ ≥ φ (r; τ), so
low-type borrowers are hurt by open banking: ∆V ξ,OBl < 0. Therefore, all borrowers are hurt by
open banking when ξ ∈
[
φ (r; τ) , ξ̃
]
even if they voluntarily choose whether or not to sign up.
Now we study firm profits. In the region of φ (r; τ) ≤ ξ ≤ φ (r; ρτ), we show that the open






b− = n+ (1− ξ)
xb − xf





1 + τ−︸ ︷︷ ︸
=πξ,OB
f−







= ξ [θ (1− ρ)σhr − (1− θ) (1− ρ)σl (1− xf )] ;
while their profits before open banking are




1 + τ − ξ
1− xb





πξf = ξθr − ξ (1− θ) (1− xf )− (1− ξ) (1− θ)xb(1− xf ).


















ξ (1− xf )







Finally we study the total profits for the financial sector ∆πξ,OBb + ∆π
ξ,OB
f , and give sufficient








(1− ξ) (1− xf )xb
1 + τ
[
1− φ (r; τ−)
φ (r; τ) + (1− ρ)σl
]
.
From (43), we have (1− ρ)σl = τ−τ−τ+−τ− , and hence the
1− φ (r; τ−)
φ (r; τ) + (1− ρ)σl =
(τ − τ−)
(τ+ − τ−) (rτ− − (1− xb) (1− xf ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
(2rτ− − rτ+ − (1− xb) (1− xf ))
(44)
Hence it boils down to the sign of the last bracket in Eq. (44). Notice that while τ− = τ is continuous
at ξ = φ (r; τ), τ+ = τ σhσl typically jumps upward at ξ = φ (r; τ) from left. So it is non-trivial to
show that the total financial sector gains even when in the neighborhood of ξ = φ (r; τ).








rτ+ − (1− xf )
rτ+ − (1− xf ) (1− xb)
)
⇔Q (τ+) ≡ (rτ+)2 − [(1 + xb) rτ− + (1− xb) (1− xf )] rτ+ + (1− xf ) rτ− = 0.
We then try to ensure that τ+ < 2τ−−
(1−xb)(1−xf)
r (so that the last bracket in Eq. (44) is positive),
by checking the sign of Q
(





(2rτ− − (1− xb) (1− xf ))2 − [(1 + xb) rτ− + (1− xb) (1− xf )] (2rτ− − (1− xb) (1− xf )) + (1− xf ) rτ−
=rτ−
2 (1− xb) rτ− − (5− xb) (1− xb) (1− xf ) + (1− xf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
M(ξ)
+ 2 (1− xb)2 (1− xf )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Because Q (·) is quadratic and open-upward, and we take the larger solution (see footnote 36), to
ensure Q
(




> 0 we need
M (ξ) ≡ 2 (1− xb) rτ− (ξ)− (5− xb) (1− xb) (1− xf ) + (1− xf ) > 0
for τ− (ξ) when ξ ∈
[
φ (r; τ) , ξ̃
]
. (Note, (1− xb)2 (1− xf )2 will be at higher order when xj ’s are
close to 1, hence can be ignored). Because τ− is decreasing in ξ, it is equivalent to ensure that
M (·) > 0 at both ends.
1. When ξ = φ (r; τ), τ− (ξ) = τ , so we require that (recall ρrτ ≥ 1− xf in (29))
2
ρ
(1− xb)− (5− xb) (1− xb) + 1 > 0. (45)
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− (1− ρ) τ















− (1− ρ) τ
− (5− xb) (1− xb) + 1 > 0, (46)





In sum, the simple conditions (45) and (46) guarantee that the financial sector gains after open
banking when ξ ∈
[
φ (r; τ) , ξ̃
]
(note, these conditions are also necessary if ρrτ = 1 − xf and for
sufficiently large xj ’s).
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Properties of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
Here we show that in our baseline model any mixed-strategy equilibrium is well behaved.
Lemma 3. In any mixed-strategy equilibrium, the two lenders’ interest rate distributions have the
following properties:
1. they share the same lower bound r > 0 and the same upper bound r in their supports;
2. they have no gaps in their supports;
3. they have no mass points except that one of them can have one at r.
Proof. Here we show the properties of a mixed-strategy equilibrium. (i) For the lower bound result,
suppose in contrast that, say, rw < rs, i.e. Fw has a smaller lower bound than Fs. Then for the
weak lender, offering r ∈ (rw, rs) is always more profitable than offering rw since both lead to the
same demand. This contradicts rw being in the support. For the upper bound result, suppose
first max{rw, rs} < r. If rw 6= rs, then for the lender with the higher upper bound, offering an
interest rate slightly above its upper bound will be a profitable deviation. If rw = rs, since it is
impossible that both distributions have a mass point at this upper bound, at least one lender will
have an incentive to slightly raise its interest rate without losing any demand. Now suppose, say,
rw < r and rs = r. Then the support of Fs should have a gap in (rw, r) since any interest rate in
this interval is dominated by r. But this is impossible in equilibrium since for at least one lender
offering an interest rate slightly above rw would be a profitable deviation. This proves rw = rs = r.
(ii) Suppose that, say, the support of Fs has a gap (r1, r2) ⊂ [r, r]. Then Fw should have no
weight in this interval either as any r ∈ (r1, r2) will lead to the same demand for the weak lender
and so a higher r will be more profitable. If neither distribution has a mass point at r1, unilaterally
offering r ∈ (r1, r2) will be a profitable deviation for either lender. If one distribution, say, Fs has
a mass point at r1, unilaterally offering r ∈ (r1, r2) will be a profitable deviation for the strong
lender. It is impossible that both distributions have a mass point at r1.
(iii) Suppose first that one distribution, say, Fs has a mass point at r = r. Then it will be a
profitable deviation for the weak lender to offer an interest rate slightly below r. Suppose then that
Fs has a mass point at r̃ ∈ (r, r). Then for the weak lender an interest rate just slightly below r̃
should be more profitable than any interest rate in [r̃, r̃+ ε] for some 0 < ε < r− r̃. In other words,
the support of Fw must have a gap in this interval. This, however, is impossible as we have shown
in (ii). Finally it is impossible that both distributions have a mass point at r.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
As this part of proof is relatively independent, for notational convenience we use α ≡ xb to denote
the traditional bank’s screening ability, and β ≡ xf , γ ≡ x′f respectively for the fintech’s screening
abilities before and after open banking.
There are three sets primitive parameters that are relatively independent in the conditions that
we need. The first set is
Γ ≡ (α, β, γ, θ) ;
the second is r̄, which mainly affects lender profits; and the last is the proportion of privacy
concerned borrowers ρ, which affects the posterior credit quality τ−, τ+ for given borrower decisions
σh, σl.
We focus on equilibrium where for borrowers without privacy concern, h type always sign up
for open banking and l type is indifferent whether or not to sign up. For illustration purpose, we
rewrite borrower surplus function as (note σl will be endogenously determined in equilibrium)
Ṽi (Γ, r̄, ρ;σl) ≡ Vi
where i = h or l. Specifically, before open banking,
Ṽi (Γ, r̄) ≡ Vi (α, β, θ) ;
after open banking, for the group of borrowers who signed up, we denote
Ṽ +i (Γ, r̄;σl) ≡ Vi
(





for the borrowers who did not sign up, we denote
Ṽ −i (Γ, r̄, ρ;σl) ≡ Vi
(
α, β, τ− =
ρτ
1− σl + ρσl
)
.
Note that the private benefit of receiving the loan does not affect borrowers’ sign up decisions.
For notational convenience, we assume vh = 0 and vl = 1 when discussing borrowers’ sign up.
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 4 Part 1 (Existence)
Step 1.
We find the parameter conditions under which there exists an equilibrium with σ̂l ∈ (0, 1) where
1) for borrowers without privacy concerns, l-type is indifferent whether or not to sign up, h-type
strictly prefers signing up, and 2) lenders are willing to participate. We show that 1) implies an
one-to mapping between σ̂l and ρ, while 2) implies that σ̂l and ρ have to satisfy another condition.
Because of the l’s indifference 1), in later proofs we can treat σ̂l ∈ (0, 1) as exogenous, derive
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∆Vl (σl, ρ) ≡ Ṽ
+
l (Γ, r̄;σl)− Ṽ
−


























Hence, if for some ρ we have
∆Vl (σl = 0, ρ) > 0, (49)
∆Vl (σl → 1, ρ) < 0, (50)
then there must exist a σ̂l ∈ (0, 1) such that
∆Vl (σl = σ̂l, ρ) = 0, (51)
and this defines a function ρ = ρ (σ̂l) such that ∆Vl (σ̂l, ρ (σl)) = 0. From implicit function theorem









And, when γ > α, from Lemma 2 we know that high type must strictly prefer signing up.
Step 1.2
We now ensure lenders’ lender participation constraints, both before open banking and after





≥ 1− β, (52)
lender participation is satisfied for borrowers who did not sign up. Because τ− ≤ τ ≤ τ+ and
β < α, lenders are also willing to participate upon H in the sign-up borrower pool and before open
banking.
For any (σ̂l, ρ) that satisfy (51) (or ρ = ρ (σ̂l)), because Ṽ −l strictly increases in r̄τ−, (52) is
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equivalent to
Ṽ +l (Γ, r̄; σ̂l) = Ṽ
−
l (Γ, r̄, ρ; σ̂l) ≥ 1− α. (53)
The advantage of (53) is to derive a condition of σ̂l to be satisfied that is free of ρ, which combined
with ρ = ρ (σ̂l) imply (52). As Ṽ +l strictly decreases in σl, (53) is equivalent toσ̂l ≤ ¯̂lσ (Γ, r̄) and
ρ = ρ (σ̂l), where ¯̂lσ (Γ, r̄) is defined as
Ṽ +l
(
Γ, r̄; ¯̂lσ (Γ, r̄)
)
= 1− α. (54)






lσ (Γ, r̄) , 1
))
. (55)
In sum, (55) translates to a non-empty set of ρ = ρ (σ̂l), (σ̂l > 0 says ρ < ρ̄ (Γ, r̄) ≡ ρ (0), which is
equivalent to (49)) together with (50) that we will ensure later, we have shown the existence of the
desired equilibrium.
Step 2.
We now impose conditions under which high-type to be hurt by open banking, i.e.,
Ṽh (Γ, r̄) > Ṽ +h (Γ, r̄; σ̂l) . (56)
This implies that everyone is hurt by open banking: anyone who does not sign up is perceived to
be of a lower average quality than the whole population, i.e., τ− < θ, and thus worse off as ∂Vi∂θ > 0;
l-type who signed up receive the same payoff as when they do not sign up, and thus also hurt by





< 0, (56) requires that
σ̂l > z (Γ, r̄)
where z (Γ, r̄) is defined as Ṽh (Γ, r̄) = Ṽ +h (Γ, r̄; σ̂l = z (Γ, r̄)). We know that z > 0.37 From (55),
we need to make sure that z < min
{
¯̂
lσ (Γ, r̄) , 1
}
. The condition for z < 1 is
Ṽh (Γ, r̄) > Ṽ +h (Γ, r̄; σ̂l = 1) ; (57)
and the condition for z < ¯̂lσ (Γ, r̄) (defined in (54)), is
Ṽh (Γ, r̄) > Ṽ +h
(




One can show that (57) implies our previous condition (50). (57) says(
r̄ − 1− β
τ
)
(1− φ (r̄;α, β, θ)) >
(
r̄ − 1− α
τ
)
(1− φ (r̄;α, γ, θ)) ,
37This is because Ṽh (Γ, r̄) < r̄ − 1−βτ < Ṽ
+





and since 1−βτ >
1−α
τ , we have φ (r̄;α, β, θ) < φ (r̄;α, γ, θ). As a result (recall φ ∈ (0, 1) and
β < α < γ, and third inequality uses φ (r̄;α, β, θ) < φ (r̄;α, γ, θ))
Ṽ +l (Γ, r̄;σl = 1) = 1− γ [α+ (1− α) · φ (r̄;α, γ, θ)]
< 1− α [α+ (1− α) · φ (r̄;α, γ, θ)]
< 1− α [β + (1− β) · φ (r̄;α, γ, θ)]
< 1− α [β + (1− β) · φ (r̄;α, β, θ)]
= Ṽ −l (Γ, r̄, ρ;σl = 1) .
Step 2.2
We now show that (57) and (58) correspond to a non-empty set of {Γ, r̄}. Let R (r̄) ≡ r̄τ1−β −1 >
0, which can be viewed as a function of r̄ given other parameters. (57) is equivalent to

























and (58) is equivalent to
G2 (R;α, γ) ≡ R2 −
(γ − α)2 (α+ 1)
α (1− γ) (1 + γ − 2α) ·R−
(γ − α)2
(1− γ) (1 + γ − 2α) > 0. (60)
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Our goal is to give a condition on R so that both (59) and (60) hold. A necessary condition for
(59) is that
β > β1 (α, γ) ≡
2α− γ (1− α)
1 + α ,
under which we have γ 1−α1−β −
α−β
1−β − α > 0. Then, because both G1 (R) = 0 and G2 (R) = 0 are
quadratic functions with one negative root and one positive root, the condition that we are after is
R (r̄) > max {R1 (α, β, γ) , R2 (α, γ)} , (61)
where R1 (α, β, γ) is the positive root of G1 (R;α, β, γ) = 0 and R2 (α, γ) is the positive root of
G2 (R;α, γ) = 0.




















1− α(1− γ)γ(1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
 < 1,
this corresponds to an inequality that says an upward quadratic function of R is positive.
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Step 3.
To sum up, if {Γ, ρ, r̄} satisfy conditions i) γ > α > β > β1 (α, γ) ≡ 2α−γ(1−α)1+α , ii) (57) and (58)
for r̄, which is summarized by (61), and finally iii) σ̂l ∈
(
z (Γ, r̄) ,min
(
¯̂
lσ (Γ, r̄) , 1
))
that imply
a compact set of ρ = ρ (σ̂l), then there exists an equilibrium such that σh = 1, σl ∈ (0, 1), and
everyone is hurt by open banking
B.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4 Part 1 (Uniqueness)
Generally there are nine possible types of equilibrium under the binary sign-up cost specification:
[σh = 1, σl = 1] [σh = 1, σl ∈ (0, 1)] [σh = 1, σl = 0]
[σh ∈ (0, 1) , σl = 1] [σh ∈ (0, 1) , σl ∈ (0, 1)] [σh ∈ (0, 1) , σl = 0]
[σh = 0, σl = 1] [σh = 0, σl ∈ (0, 1)] [σh = 0, σl = 0]
where the equilibrium that we construct is boldfaced. Notice that [σh = 0, σl = 0] could be sup-
ported by any consistent off-equilibrium belief of θ+. In this part, we argue that if (62) holds
additionally, then except for the special equilibrium [σh = 0, σl = 0], the equilibrium constructed
in Part 1 is unique.
The additional condition we need for uniqueness is





which is equivalent to
Vl(α, γ, θ+ = 1) > Vl(α, β, θ) (63)
once we plug in borrower surplus (9) and (10). Note that even when θ+ = 1, we assume that firms
still screen the consumer who signs up. As there is no cost in screening, this assumption leads to
a more general argument, whereas (63) is automatically satisfied if firms do not screen and always
serve the sign-up consumer given θ+ = 1. (63) says l (0) will sign on if he is perceived to be h-type
when doing so, relative to being perceived as the average type θ by not signing on.
We need to verify that the set of primitive parameters that satisfies all the sufficient conditions
is non-empty. In light of (61), we need that
R3 (α, β, γ) > max {R1 (α, β, γ) , R2 (α, γ)} , (64)
and we aim to provide a sufficient condition under which (64) holds.
For any γ > α, if β = α, we have R1 (α, β = α, γ) = 0 < R2 (α, γ). Recall that for R >
R1 (α, β, γ) to be sufficient for (59), we need β > β1 (α, γ) ≡ 2α−γ(1−α)1+α with β1 (α, γ) < α. Note
that we have R1
(
α, β → β1 (α, γ)+ , γ
)
= +∞ > R2 (α, γ). Define
β̂ (α, γ) ≡ sup {β : R1 (α, β, γ) = R2 (α, γ) , β1 (α, γ) < β < α} , (65)
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which must satisfy β1 (α, γ) < β̂ (α, γ) < α strictly. Then when β ∈
(
β̂ (α, γ) , α
)
, we have
R2 (α, γ) > R1 (α, β, γ), and therefore (64) is equivalent to
R3 (α, β, γ) > R2 (α, γ) . (66)
Note that ∂R3(α,β,γ)∂β > 0; then a sufficient condition for (66) where β > β̂ (α, γ) > β1 (α, γ) is
R3 (α, β1 (α, γ) , γ) > R2 (α, γ) . (67)
The condition (67) only involves α and γ, and we derive the restriction on the space of {α, γ} so
that (67) holds.
Because R3 (α, β1 (α, γ) , γ) = α(1−γ)(1+α)2(γ−α) > 0, and G2 (R) = 0 is a quadratic function with one
negative root and one positive root, (67) is equivalent to
G2 (R3 (α, β1 (α, γ) , γ)) =
α2 (1− γ)2 (1 + α)2
4 (γ − α)2
− (γ − α) (α+ 1)
2
2 (1 + γ − 2α) −
(γ − α)2
(1− γ) (1 + γ − 2α)
≡ G̃2 (γ;α) > 0.




G2 (R3 (α, β1 (α, γ) , γ))→ +∞,
we know there exists a γ̂ (α) > α such that when α < γ < γ̂ (α), (67) is satisfied.
39Let g1 (γ;α) ≡ 1−γγ−α , and g2 (γ;α) =
γ−α
1+γ−2α ; then with 1 > γ > α > 0 we have
∂g1 (γ;α)
∂γ
< 0, ∂g2 (γ;α)
∂γ
> 0.
As a result, the following function is strictly decreases in γ:
G̃2 (γ;α) =
α2 (1 + α)2
4 · g1 (γ;α)
2 − (1 + α)
2
2 · g2 (γ;α)−
g2 (γ;α)
g1 (γ;α)
.
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